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Lesperance: A Unique Preemption Problem: The Insurance and Banking Industries

A UNIQUE PREEMPTION PROBLEM:
THE INSURANCE AND BANKING INDUSTRIES
ENGAGE IN WAR
"Some things just don't go together. Cats and dogs. Oil and water. Insurance
agents and bankers. "'
I. INTRODUCTION

Since 1967, the insurance industry has struggled to defend its business
markets from multiple attacks by the banking industry.' In recent years, this
The banking industry, fueled by a recent
ongoing battle has intensified.
Supreme Court victory in the annuities market, 4 quickly turned its sights to

1. Mark A. Hofmann, Alliance: Independent Bankers and InsuranceAgents Join Forces to
Prevent Ventures Between Banks and Insurers, Bus. INS., Nov. 6, 1995, at 32B.
2. Georgia Ass'n of Indep. Ins. Agents, Inc. v. Saxon, 268 F. Supp. 236 (N.D. Ga. 1967).
In 1967, the Georgia Association of Independent Insurance Agents brought an action against a
national bank that was selling insurance out of its Atlanta, Georgia office. Id. at 237. The agents
received a declaratory judgment and an injunction against the bank. Id. The court reasoned that
section 92 of the National Bank Act prohibited the banks' actions. Id. at 238. The United States
Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed the decision in favor of the insurance agents. Saxon
v. Georgia Ass'n of Indep. Ins. Agents, 399 F.2d 1010, 1014 (5th Cir. 1968).
The explanation for the war between insurance agents and bankers is simple: bankers want to
sell insurance, and insurance agents do not want them to. Hofmann, supra note 1, at 32B. For a
thorough discussion of the principle reasons that banks are expanding into new marketplaces, see
JAMES J. WHITE, BANKING LAW 34-37 (1976).
3. See Richard M. Whiting, Key Issues Unresolved as Banks, InsuranceFirms Keep Fighting
Over Turf, BANKING POL'Y REP., May 15, 1995, at 1 (noting that the commercial war between the
insurance and banking industries has steadily increased in intensity over the past 25 years); William
G. McCullough, The Continuing Evolution of Banks' Insurance Powers, 69 FLA. L. REV. 70, 70
(1995) (arguing that the future will see substantial changes with respect to the ability of banks to
engage in the sale of insurance products).
4. NationsBank of N.C. v. Variable Annuity Life Ins. Co., 115 S. Ct. 810 (1995). In
NationsBank, the Supreme Court held that annuities are "financial investment instruments" rather
than "insurance" for the purposes of the National Bank Act. Id. at 814. Thus, national banks could
sell annuities without the limitations imposed by section 92 of the National Bank Act. Id. at 816.
See infra notes 54-71 and accompanying text for a discussion of section 92 of the National Bank
Act.
The NationsBank decision is important because it represents the "first instance" where powers
not specifically enumerated in the National Bank Act were implied into that Act. McCullough,
supra note 3, at 72; Jason M. Koral, Bank Holding Conpaniesand "The Business of Insurance":
Interpretationsof McCarran-Fergusonin Owensboro National Bank v. Stephens, 44 F.3d 388 (6th
Cir. 1994), and Barnett Bank v. Gallagher, 43 F.3d 631 (11th Cir. 1995), 19 HARv. J.L. & PUB.
POL'Y 217, 217 (1995).
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selling general insurance without geographic limitation through a small-town
loophole found at 12 U.S.C § 92 (section 92).'
In the initial stages of the battle, the insurance industry relied on section 92

to exclude national banks from establishing insurance agencies in towns with
more than 5000 people. 6 However, in 1986, the federal agency responsible for
supervising the National Bank Act, the Office of the Comptroller of the
Currency (OCC or Comptroller),7 interpreted section 92 to allow national banks
operating under section 92 to sell insurance to customers outside of their small
towns.' Further, the circuit courts upheld the OCC's expansive interpretation. 9
As a result, the insurance industry abandoned its reliance on section 92.10
Instead, the insurance industry sought to prevent national banks from exercising
any of their section 92 insurance powers." The methods of prevention used
by the insurance industry were state anti-affiliation statutes which precluded bank

5. 12 U.S.C. § 92 (1994). Section 92, a provision of the National Bank Act of 1864,
specifically empowers nationally chartered banks properly located in small towns with less than 5000
people to engage in the sale of insurance. Id. See also Whiting, supra note 3, at 1; David W.
Roderer & William B.F. Steinman, The Authority for Banks to Sell Annuities and Insurance Related
Products, 48 CONsUMER FIN. L.Q. REP. 395, 395 (1994) (noting that the name "small town
loophole" refers to section 92's grant of power only to national banks located in small towns).
6. See, e.g., Saxon, 399 F.2d at 1010. In Saxon, a national bank began selling insurance out
of its Atlanta, Georgia office. Id. at 1012. The court held that section 92 prohibited the sale of
insurance in towns with more than 5000 people. Id. at 1014. See infra notes 76-91 and
accompanying text (discussing the Saxon decision).
7. The OCC was created in the National Bank Act of 1864. 12 U.S.C. § 3 (1994). One of the
Comptroller's many duties is to regulate and supervise the national banks. WHITE, supra note 2,
at 66. The OCC is inherently close to the national banks because they owe their very existence to
the OCC. Id. Besides granting charters for the national banks, the OCC regulates the national
banks through its power to interpret the National Bank Act. Id. at 66-76.
8. See OCC Inter. Ltr. 366 [1985-1987 Transfer Binder] Fed. Banking L. Rep. (CCH)
1 85,536 (Aug. 18, 1986). See infra note 96 for the pertinent portions of the OCC's letter.
9. Independent Ins. Agents v. Ludwig, 997 F.2d 958 (D.C. Cir. 1993); NBD Bank v. Bennett,
677 F.3d 629 (7th Cir. 1995). In the Ludwig decision, the D.C. Circuit paved the way for
nationally chartered banks to sell insurance, through their branches located in small towns with a
population of 5000 or less, without geographic limitation. Philip C. Meyer, Bank Insurance Powers
Are Under Renewed Attack in Courts and Congress, BANKING POL'Y REP., Apr. 17, 1995, at 7.
Likewise, the Seventh Circuit's agreement with the Ludwig decision in NBD reinforced the OCC's
expansive interpretation of section 92. See infra notes 92-123 and accompanying text for a further
discussion.
10. In light of the Ludwig decision, it was apparent that the insurance industry would need to
take some form of action. Whiting, supra note 3. at 2.
11. See, e.g., Barnett Bank of Marion County v. Gallagher, 43 F.3d 631 (11th Cir. 1995);
Owensboro Nat'l Bank v. Stephens, 44 F.3d 388 (6th Cir. 1994); First Advantage Ins. v. Green,
652 So. 2d 562 (La. Ct. App. 1995).
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subsidiaries or bank holding companies from conducting insurance activities in
their respective states. 12
A direct conflict existed between section 92 and the state anti-affiliation
laws.' 3 This problem, however, was different than ordinary Supremacy
Clause 4 problems because Congress expressly gave the right to regulate the
insurance industry to the several states through the McCarran-Ferguson Act of
1945.15 The McCarran-Ferguson Act creates reverse-preemption whereby state
insurance laws preempt acts of Congress unless Congress speaks directly to the

12. Generally, state anti-affiliation statutes prohibit the affiliation of banks and insurance
agencies. Whiting, supra note 3, at 2. Anti-affiliation statutes work by prohibiting banks from
obtaining a license to engage in insurance agency activities. Koral, supra note 4, at 218.
Sixteen states have enacted some form of an anti-affiliation statute. See ALASKA STAT.
§ 06.05.272 (Michie 1996); ARK. CODE ANN. § 23-64-203(b) (Michie 1994 & Supp. 1995); COLO.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 10-2-601.(2) (West 1992 & Supp. 1996); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 38a-775
(West 1992 & Supp. 1996); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 626.988 (West 1996 & Supp. 1997); GA. CODE
ANN. § 33-3-23 (1992); ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 215/5-499.1 (West 1993 & Supp. 1996); LA. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 121-B(2) (West 1986 & Supp. 1997); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 175, § 174E
(West 1987 & Supp. 1997); MICH. COMP. LAWS. ANN. § 500.1242 (West 1993); N.M. STAT. ANN.
§ 59A-12-10 (Michie 1995 Repl.); N.Y. INS. LAW § 2501 (McKinney 1985); OHIO REV. CODE
ANN. § 3911.01 (Banks-Baldwin 1995); 40 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 281(b) (West Supp. 1996);
R.I. GEN. LAWS. § 27-3-46 (Supp. 1996); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 8, § 4811(a) (1993). For a general
discussion of anti-affiliation statutes, see Karol K. Sparks, Towards Functional Regulation:
Untangling Bank and InsuranceLaw, 912 PRAC. LAW INST. 595, 598 n.26 (1995).
13. Koral, supra note 4, at 218 (noting that the conflict between section 92 and the
anti-affiliation statutes has recently been played out in the circuit courts); McCullough, supra note
3, at 73 (adding further that the two circuits that addressed this conflict, the Sixth and Eleventh
Circuits, have arrived at opposite conclusions under nearly identical facts); Philip C. Meyer,
InsuranceAmendments CloudOutlookfor Major Banking Measures, BANKING POL'Y REP., July 17,
1995, at 8.
14. The Supremacy Clause of the United States Constitution provides:
This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall be made in Pursuance
thereof; and all Treaties made, or which shall be made, under the Authority of the
United States, shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and the Judges in every State shall
be bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary
notwithstanding.
U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl.2.
Normally, "the Supremacy Clause mandates that federal law overrides, i.e., preempts, any
state regulation where there is an actual conflict between the two sets of legislation." JOHN E.
NOWAK Er AL., CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 292 (2d. ed. 1983). Note, this traditional approach to
preemption applies whether Congress articulates the specific intention to preempt or not. Id.
15. McCarran-Ferguson Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1011-1015 (1994). The McCarran-Ferguson Act
was passed in response to the Supreme Court's ruling in United States v. South-Eastern Underwriters
Ass'n, 322 U.S. 533 (1944). In that case, the Court held for the first time that the business of
insurance was part of interstate commerce and therefore subject to federal regulation. Id. at 562.
The McCarran-Ferguson Act indicated Congress' intent to leave the regulation of the insurance
industry to the several states. 15 U.S.C. § 1012(b) (1994). Thus, the McCarran-Ferguson Act
created a reverse preemption whereby state insurance laws could preempt federal laws as long as two
factors were satisfied. Sparks, supra note 12, at 597.
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regulation of insurance. 16 The insurance industry contended that anti-affiliation
statutes fell under the unique protection from ordinary preemption provided for
in the McCarran-Ferguson Act.' 7 In direct contrast, however, the banking
industry contended that section 92 should preempt the anti-affiliation statutes
because section 92 speaks directly to the regulation of insurance, thereby
representing a clear intention by Congress to control this issue on the federal
level.' In practice, the resolution of this conflict has proven to be difficult and
the circuit courts have split over which law should prevail. 19
Both the Sixth and Eleventh Circuits recently reviewed conflicts between
section 92 and two state anti-affiliation statutes.20 Those courts arrived at
opposite conclusions under nearly identical facts. 2 The Sixth Circuit supported
the banking industry's contention that section 92 should preempt Kentucky's
anti-affiliation statute.22
Conversely, the Eleventh Circuit supported the
insurance industry's contention.2" The United States Court of Appeals for the

16. Sparks, supra note 12. Id. at 598. The McCarran-Ferguson Act reverses the normal order
of federal supremacy law. Id. The McCarran-Ferguson Act will not, however, provide a means
of reverse preemption where Congress has specifically spoken to the area of insurance. 15 U.S.C.
§ 1012(b). For a full discussion of the constitutional requirements for reverse preemption under the
McCarran-Ferguson Act, see infra notes 128-44 and accompanying text.
17. A facet of Florida's insurance industry has submitted an Amicus Brief to the Supreme Court
in the Barnett case. Brief for Respondent Florida Association of Life Underwriters, Barnett Bank
of Marion County v. Nelson, 116 S. Ct. 39 (1995) (No. 94-1837). In the insurance agents' brief,
they contend that Florida's anti-affiliation statute should preempt section 92 because Florida's law
regulates insurance whereas section 92 regulates banks. Id.
18. Various banking interests have submitted Amicus Briefs to the Supreme Court on behalf
of the Barnett Bank of Marion County in the defense of section 92. See, e.g., Brief of Amicus
Curiae Florida Bankers Association in Support of Petitioner, Barnett (No. 94-1837); Brief of
American Deposit Corporation in Support of Petitioner, Barnett (No. 94-1837); Brief of the New
York Clearing House Association in Support of Petitioner, Barnett (No. 94-1837); Brief of the
United States and the Comptroller of the Currency in Support of Petitioner, Barnett (No. 94-1837);
Brief of the American Bankers Association in Support of Petitioner, Barnett (No. 94-1837); Brief
of Consumer Bankers Association et al., Barnett (No. 94-1837).
19. One scholar predicted, before the Supreme Court's decision in Barnett, that a decision in
favor of the banking industry would allow nationally chartered banks to open up agencies all over
the country, Hofmann, supra note 1, at 32B. However, a defeat for the insurance industry would
likely turn its primary statute for federal authority, the McCarran-Ferguson Act, into Swiss cheese.
Id. at 32B. In contrast, a victory for the insurance industry would declare state law under the
McCarran-Ferguson Act as pre-eminent. Id.
20. McCullough, supra note 3, at 72; State Attacks on NationalBank InsurancePowers Reach
U.S. Supreme Court, BANKING POL'Y REP., June 5, 1995, at 2.
21. McCullough, supra note 3, at 72 (noting the strong similarities in facts between the two
circuit cases).
22. Owensboro Nat'l Bank v. Stephens, 44 F.3d 388 (6th Cir. 1994). The court based its
decision on the first prong of the McCarran-Ferguson test. Id. at 390-92. For a discussion of that
test, developed from section 1012(b) of the McCarran-Ferguson Act, see infra notes 128-44 and
accompanying text.
23. Bamett Bank of Marion County v. Gallagher, 43 F.3d 631, 633 (11th Cir. 1995).
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Eleventh Circuit held that Florida's anti-affiliation statute regulated the business
of insurance and, therefore, preempted section 92 under the limited exception
provided in the McCarran-Ferguson Act. 24 As a result, the Eleventh Circuit's
decision allowed Florida to prevent national banks in Florida from exercising
any of their section 92 insurance powers.'
On September 27, 1995, the United States Supreme Court granted certiorari
to the petitioners of the Eleventh Circuit's decision in Barnett Bank of Marion
County v. Nelson. 6 However, the current language of section 92 and the
McCarran-Ferguson Act prohibited the Court from deciding this conflict in
accordance with Congress' original intentions for those statutes.27
For
example, on March 26, 1996, the Court decided the Barnett case in favor of
section 92, thus making the banking industry free to sell insurance on a
statewide basis under the OCC's current interpretation of section 92.28 That
result is contrary to Congress' purposes for enacting both section 92 and the
McCarran-Ferguson Act.29 Similarly, however, the purpose for section 92
would have been thwarted if the Court had decided that state anti-affiliation
statutes like Florida's preempt section 92.
Under that result, states could
prohibit national banks located in small towns from exercising any of their
Congressionally authorized section 92 insurance powers.31 Thus, the judicial
branch is not the proper body to change or modify a statute "[because] when
time and technology open up a loophole, it is up to Congress to decide whether
it should be plugged, and how. "32

24. Barnett, 43 F.3d at 638. See infra notes 218-37 and accompanying text for a discussion
of the Barnett case.
25. Koral, supra note 4, at 219.
26. Barnett Bank of Marion County v. Gallagher, cert. granted sub nor, Barnett Bank of
Marion County v. Nelson, 116 S. Ct. 39 (1995).
27. The ambiguous language of section 92 has allowed the OCC to interpret it broadly. OCC
Inter. Ltr. 366 [1985-1987 Transfer Binder] Fed. Banking L. Rep. (CCH) 1 85,536 (Aug. 18,
1986). See infra notes 252-80 and accompanying text (demonstrating that the ambiguous language
of section 92 prohibits the Supreme Court from deciding this conflict in accordance with Congress'
original intentions for enacting section 92 and the McCarran-Ferguson Act).
28. Barnett, 116 S. Ct. at 1103.
29. See infra notes 238-80 and accompanying text.
30. See infra notes 281-83 and accompanying text.
31. See infra notes 274-83 and accompanying text.
32. Independent Ins. Agents of Am., Inc. v. Ludwig, 997 F.2d 958, 961 (D.C. Cir. 1993).
"If the judge were to guess at the interpretation, and arbitrarily fix the result, no doubt it would be
true that he [or she] would be assuming the functions of a legislator." G.A. ENDLICH, A
COMMENTARY ON THE INTERPRETATION OF STATUTES 12 (1888). However, the Constitution vests
the power to make laws in the legislature. J.G. SUTHERLAND, STATUTES AND STATUTORY
CONSTRUCTION 68 (1891). Further, the power to legislate is not one which may be delegated. Id.
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This Note examines the conflict between section 92 of the National Bank
Act and the state anti-affiliation statutes authorized under the
McCarran-Ferguson Act.33 Additionally, this Note suggests that the Supreme
Court was unable to solve this conflict in accordance with Congress' original
intentions due to the current language of section 92 and the McCarran-Ferguson
Act.' Therefore, this Note proposes an amendment to section 92 that will
provide a compromise between the contentions of both the banking and
insurance industries. 35 This amendment will narrow the scope of the national
banks' powers to sell insurance to the level present in 1945, when Congress
enacted the McCarran-Ferguson Act. 36
Section II of this Note reviews the historical and legislative background of
section 92 and the McCarran-Ferguson Act.37 The historical role of the OCC's
interpretations of section 92 of the National Bank Act on this unique problem is
also reviewed in Section II.38 Section III critically analyzes the recent attempts
by the Sixth Circuit, the Eleventh Circuit, and the Supreme Court of the United
States to resolve this conflict. 39 Further, Section III concludes that the
Supreme Court's recent decision overruling the Eleventh Circuit did not resolve
this conflict in accordance with Congress' original intentions due to the present
language of the statutes involved.'
Finally, Section IV solves the conflict
between section 92 and the state anti-affiliation statutes authorized under the
McCarran-Ferguson Act by providing a model congressional amendment to'
section 92.41 This amendment will be based upon the historical and legislative
background of section 92 and the McCarran-Ferguson Act.42
II. BACKGROUND
The battle between the insurance and banking industries over the right of
national banks to sell insurance under section 92 created a conflict between
33. See infra section III (analyzing this conflict in the context of two opposing circuit court
decisions and a Supreme Court ruling).
34. See infra section IIl.C (arguing that the Supreme Court was unable to resolve this conflict
in accordance with Congress' original intentions for enacting section 92 and the McCarran-Ferguson
Act).
35. See infra section IV.
36. See infra section IV.
37. See infra notes 54-71, 128-44 and accompanying text.
38. See infra notes 72-127 and accompanying text.
39. See infra notes 145-285 and accompanying text.
40. See infra notes 276-85 and accompanying text.
41. See infra notes 286-308 and accompanying text.
42. See infra section II.
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several states and the federal government.43 The states were attempting to
prohibit banks from acting as insurance agents by passing anti-affiliation
statutes."
In contrast, the federal government argued that states cannot
prohibit national banks from selling insurance because section 92 of the National
Bank Act expressly allows national banks to act as insurance agents in small
towns.45 Thus, a clear conflict existed as to which law should apply.
The Sixth and Eleventh Circuits have each attempted to resolve this conflict
concerning which law should apply.'
However, both courts were troubled
with the current language of section 92 and the state anti-affiliation statutes
authorized under the McCarran-Ferguson Act. 47 As a result, the courts arrived
at opposite decisions under nearly identical facts.4 It became apparent from
these cases that much confusion exists concerning the applications of section 92
and the McCarran-Ferguson Act. 49 Further, both circuit court decisions
contradicted the historical and legislative backgrounds behind the enactment of
section 92 and the McCarran-Ferguson Act.5°
Like the circuit courts, the Supreme Court was unable to solve the conflict
between section 92 and the McCarran-Ferguson Act in accordance with

43. See State Attacks on NationalBank Insurance PowersReach U.S. Supreme Court, BANKING
POL'Y REP., June 5, 1995, at 2 [hereinafter State Attacks] (noting that "[a] key unresolved legal
question is whether states can block national banks [authorized under federal laws] from exercising
their small-town insurance agency powers by denying them licenses to sell insurance"). David W.
Roderer, Supreme Court Alert to Complexity, Stakes in Insurance Sales Case, AM. BANKER, Jan.
23, 1996, at 10 (noting that this conflict between banks and insurance agents, as demonstrated in the
Barnettcase, will provide "an opportunity for the Justices to delineate the respective roles of federal
and state regulators").
44. See, e.g., Barnett Bank of Marion County v. Gallagher, 43 F.3d 631, 632 (1 1th Cir. 1995);
Owensboro Nat'l Bank v. Stephens, 44 F.3d 388, 389 (6th Cir. 1994).
45. See, e.g., Brief for the United States and the Comptroller of the Currency, Barnett Bank
of Marion County v. Nelson, 116 S. Ct. 39 (1995) (No. 94-1837). Specifically, the federal
government argued that section 92 preempts any state law to the contrary since Congress has spoken
directly to the regulation of banking in enacting section 92. Id. at 6.
46. Barnett, 43 F.3d at 633 (noting that the issue before the court was to decide whether
Florida's anti-affiliation statute was preempted by section 92); Owensboro, 44 F.3d 389 (addressing
the issue of whether Kentucky's anti-affiliation statute was preempted by section 92).
47. The Owensboro and Barnettdecisions both addressed the issue of whether section 92 could
preempt anti-affiliation statutes authorized under the McCarran-Ferguson Act. McCullough, supra
note 3, at 72. However, those courts arrived at opposite decisions. Id.
48. Barnett, 43 F.3d at 637; Owensboro, 44 F.3d at 393.
49. See Koral, supra note 4, at 219; McCullough, supra note 3, at 70 (noting that the decision
of the Eleventh Circuit demonstrates the state of flux in this area of the law); State Attacks, supra
note 43, at 2 (arguing that the circuit court attempts at a resolution have left key questions
unresolved).
50. See infra sections HLA, III.B.
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Over time, the OCC's interpretations of
Congress' original intentions.51
section 92 have expanded its small town limitation beyond small towns. 52 The
changes necessary to narrow the scope of section 92 can only be made by
Congress. 3 Thus, a legal conflict still exists after the Supreme Court's
decision in Barnett because the judicial legislation created in that decision was
an unsatisfactory solution. A review of the historical and legislative intent
behind section 92 and the McCarran-Ferguson Act will clarify the Supreme
Court's shortcomings and lay the foundation for why the model amendments
proposed in this Note should be adopted by Congress.
A. Section 92
The controversy surrounding the national banks' powers to sell insurance
to their customers begins with section 92 of the National Bank Act." Prior to
the enactment of section 92, the clear rule was that banks possessed no right to
sell insurance.5" In 1916, however, Congress made a limited exception to the

general rule against banks selling insurance by enacting section 92.56 The
51. See infra section IIl.C (discussing the Supreme Court's failure to resolve this conflict in
accordance with Congress' original intentions).
52. See infra note 96 and accompanying text for the pertinent portions of the OCC's letter
explaining its expansive interpretation of section 92.
53. See supra note 32 and accompanying text (outlining the premise that the legislature, not the
courts, is responsible for changing a statute that has fallen into disagreement with its original
intentions).
54. Over the past few years, the OCC has expanded the national banks' insurance powers under
section 92. Koral, supra note 4, at 217. "The controversy surrounding the ability of national banks
to sell insurance and related products to their customers and the general public focuses primarily on
. . . 12 U.S.C. Section 92, commonly referred to ... as the 'small town loophole.'" Rod~rer &
Steinman, supra note 5, at 395-96.
55. Saxon v. Georgia Ass'n of Indep. Ins. Agents, Inc., 399 F.2d 1010, 1013 (5th Cir. 1968)
(taking note that "prior to the 1916 enactment of Section 92 it seems to have been universally
understood that no national bank possessed any power to act as insurance agents").
56. 12 U.S.C. § 92 (1992). The current text of section 92 provides:
In addition to the powers now vested by law in national banking associations organized
under the laws of the United States any such association located and doing business in
any place the population of which does not exceed five thousand inhabitants, as shown
by the last preceding decennial census, may, under such rules and regulations as may
be prescribed by the Comptroller of the Currency, act as the agent for any fire, life, or
other insurance company authorized by the authorities of the State in which said bank
is located to do business in said State, by soliciting and selling insurance and collecting
premiums on policies issued by such company; and may receive for services so rendered
such fees or commissions as may be agreed upon between the said association and the
insurance company for which it may act as agent: Provided, however, That no such
bank shall in any case assume or guarantee the payment of any premium on insurance
policies issued through its agency by its principal: And providedfurther, That the bank
shall not guarantee the truth of any statement made by an assured in filing his
application for insurance.
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legislative history behind section 92 demonstrates that it was enacted for the
limited purpose of aiding struggling national banks located in small towns.57
The origin of section 92 can be traced back to a single letter written to
Congress in 1916 by then Comptroller of the Currency, John Skelton
Williams. 5" In his letter, Williams addressed Congress' concern over the
continued financial security of the nationally chartered banks located in small
towns.5 9 This concern was based on the inability of national banks to compete
effectively with their state chartered counterparts.' In 1916, both national and
state banks in small towns received only small deposits. 6 The low deposits
forced nationally chartered banks to charge high interest rates.62 However, the
state banks could often maintain lower interest rates by supplementing their
incomes through alternative means allowed under state laws.63 The lower
interest rates charged by state banks enabled them to create greater revenues
than their nationally chartered counterparts.6
Williams' letter suggested that allowing national banks to act as insurance
agents in their small towns would offset the problems that high interest rates
were causing.' In his letter, Williams noted that small local insurance markets

Id. (emphasis in original).
57. The legislative history behind the enactment of section 92 reveals a letter by the OCC to
Senator Robert L. Owen. 53 CONG. REC. 11,001 (1916). In that letter, the OCC suggested that
Congress enact a limited exception to the general rule that national banks cannot sell insurance. Id.
The OCC reasoned that the national banks located in small towns were at a distinct disadvantage to
their state chartered counterparts. Id.
58. Id.
59. Id.
60. Id.
61. Id. The Comptroller wrote:
[Tihere are many banks located in country communities where the small deposits which
the banks receive may make it somewhat difficult for the banks to charge on their loans
only the rates of interest permitted by law and at the same time yield a satisfactory
return to shareholders, and in many such cases banks have been tempted to exact
excessive and in some cases grossly usurious rates on accommodations which they
extend to local borrowers.
Id.
62. Id. The Comptroller regrettably admitted that these low deposits were resulting in high
interest rates. Id.
63. 53 CONG. REC. 11,001 (1916). The Comptroller wrote,
I have been giving careful consideration to the question as to how the powers of these
small national banks might be enlarged so as to provide them with additional sources of
revenue and place them in a position where they could better compete with local State
banks ... which are sometimes authorized under the law to do a class of business not
strictly that of commercial banking.
Id.
64. Id.
65. Id.
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would not generate enough business to distract the banks from their primary loan
and depository functions.'
In fact, Williams' letter stated that limiting the
national banks' insurance powers authorized under section 92 was in the public's
best interest. 67
On September 7, 1916, Congress enacted the law that Williams had
recommended in his letter. 61 That law ultimately appeared as section 92 of
Title 12 of the United States Code.' The primary congressional purpose of
section 92 was to provide another source of income for the struggling national
banks that were located in small towns. 70 This purpose is evidenced by
Williams' letter, which is a permanent part of the Congressional Record of
1916. 7'
B. The Role of the OCC in the Insurance-Banking War
A historical review of the OCC's interpretations of section 92 of the
National Bank Act demonstrates the need for an amendment to that Act. 72 The
OCC's interpretations have consistently attempted to expand section 92's scope
beyond Congress' original intentions. 3 In recent years, these interpretations
have received a large degree of judicial deference by the courts.74 Thus,
Congress needs to amend the language of section 92 to narrow its scope in

66. Id. Comptroller Williams wrote that "[t]his additional income will strengthen them and
increase their ability to make a fair return to their shareholders, while the new business is not likely
to assume such proportions as to distract the officers of the bank from the principal business of
banking." Id.
67. Id. The Comptroller wrote, "[i]t seems desirable from the standpoint of public policy and
banking efficiency that this authority should be limited to banks in small communities."
68. 12 U.S.C. § 92 (1994).
69. Id.
70. The purpose of section 92 was provided in Comptroller Williams' letter to Congress. 53
CONG. REC. 11,001 (1916).
71. Id.
72. Congress intended for the scope of section 92 to aid only those national banks located and
doing business in small towns. Id. In contrast, the OCC has expanded section 92 over the past few
years. Koral, supra note 4, at 217. These expansions were accomplished because section 92
neglects to discuss where national banks' customers must be located. Independent Ins. Agents of
Am., Inc. v. Ludwig, 997 F.2d 958, 959 (D.C. Cir. 1993).
73. For example, the OCC recently determined that national banks could operate under section
92 and sell insurance to customers outside of those small towns. OCC Inter. Ltr. 366 (1985-1987
Transfer Binder] Fed. Banking L. Rep. (CCH) 85,536 (Aug. 18, 1986).
74. See, e.g., Ludwig, 997 F.2d at 962 (upholding the OCC's interpretation expanding section
92 to customers of all cities as reasonable); NationsBank of North Carolina v. Variable Annuity Life
Ins. Co., 513 U.S. 251 (1995) (upholding the OCC's interpretation of the National Bank Act
allowing annuities to be sold by national banks as an incidental function of banking). For a
discussion of judicial deference, see infra notes 101-03 and accompanying text.
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accordance with Congress' original intentions. 75
1. Section 92 as a Restraint on the National Banks
In 1962, then Comptroller of the Currency, James Saxon, created a
National Advisory Committee on Banking Regulatory Policies and Practices. 76
Comptroller Saxon instructed the Committee to investigate possible changes in
the laws affecting national banks.'
The Committee, composed entirely of
people affiliated with the banking
industry,
recommended that national banks be
78
allowed to sell insurance.

Under the Committee's recommendation, Comptroller Saxon created an
Administrative Ruling which stated that "National Banks have the authority to
act as agent in the issuance of insurance which is incident to banking
transactions. " ' In 1964, the Citizens and Southern National Bank of Georgia
(Citizens) applied for and received the OCC's permission to sell insurance.'
In 1965, Citizens began selling insurance from its offices located in Atlanta,
Georgia."8 To protect their business market from this invasion, the Georgia
Association of Independent Insurance Agents filed suit against Comptroller
Saxon and Citizens.'
The district court in Georgia Ass'n of Independent

75. Congress' original intent for enacting section 92 was to aid national banks located and doing
business in small towns. 53 CONG. REc. 11,001 (1916). In contrast, the OCC has expanded section
92 to allow for the sale of insurance by banks to customers on a statewide basis. Ludwig, 997 F.2d
at 959 (relying on 12 C.F.R. § 5.34). Thus, since time has created a loophole in section 92's
clearly established purpose, Congress needs to amend that section. Id.
76. Saxon v. Georgia Ass'n of Indep. Ins. Agents, 399 F.2d 1010, 1012 (5th Cir. 1968).
77. Id.
78. Id. This Committee was formed one year after Comptroller James J. Saxon's appointment
to the Office of Comptroller. Id. In his prior position as the Secretary of an Advisory Committee
to Congress, Saxon had attempted to propose legislation similar to that recommended by his newly
created committee in 1967. Id. Congress, however, rejected Saxon's proposal from his prior
position. Id. In Saxon, Comptroller Saxon tried to go around Congress by creating an
Administrative Ruling. Id.
79. Saxon, 399 F.2d at 1012 (quoting the Comptroller's 1963 ruling, number 7110). The court
noted that instead of asking Congress to create legislation in accordance with the Committee's
recommendation, Comptroller Saxon took it upon himself to create an Administrative Ruling. Id.
The court further noted that the Comptroller's ruling was not limited in scope to cities of 5000
inhabitants or less as required by section 92. Id. Rather, the ruling allowed any national bank,
regardless of its location, to enter the insurance industry and sell insurance. Id.
80. Id. The OCC's permission allowed Citizens to sell broad forms of automobile, home,
casualty and liability insurance out of its Atlanta, Georgia office. Id. The court noted that Citizens'
program was also extended to its offices in Athens, Augusta, Macon, Savannah and Valdosta,
Georgia. Id.
81. Id.
82. Saxon v. Georgia Ass'n of Indep. Ins. Agents, 399 F.2d 1010, 1012 (5th Cir. 1968).

Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 1997

Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 31, No. 3 [1997], Art. 8

1152

VALPARAISO UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 31

Insurance Agents v. Saxon83 agreed with the insurance agents and held that
section 92 is the full extent of insurance agency power possessed by national

banks.'
The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed the
district court's holding that section 92 limits national banks to act as insurance
agents only in cities with a population less than 5 0 0 0 .n The court noted that
prior to the enactment of section 92 in 1916, it was universally understood that
no national banks possessed the power to act as insurance agents.A6 Thus, the
court concluded that Congress intended for section 92 to be a limited exception
to the general rule that national banks could not sell insurance.'
The court's
reasoning was based on the well established principle of statutory construction
mandating that "when a statute limits a thing to be done in a particular mode,
it includes the negative of any other mode."'
The Fifth Circuit's decision in Saxon was based upon the congressional
intentions behind the enactment of section 92.19 In Saxon, the OCC had
attempted to give insurance powers to the national banks that Congress had
purposefully omitted from the text of section 92.
Thus, the OCC's
interpretation of section 92 in Saxon was unreasonable. 9'

83. 268 F. Supp. 236 (N.D. Ga. 1967), aff'd, 399 F.2d 1010 (5th Cir. 1968).
84. Saxon, 268 F. Supp. at 238-39. In finding that section 92 limited the locations from which
national banks could operate, the court noted that section 92 does not specifically prohibit banks
from acting as insurance agents in areas with populations larger than 5000 people. Id. at 238.
However, the court found that Congress had prohibited banks from acting as insurance agents in
large cities through implication by explicitly allowing an exception for national banks located in
small towns of less than 5000. Id.
85. Saxon, 399 F.2d at 1012. The court of appeals agreed with the district court stating that
"[s]ince Congress dealt specifically with the insurance agency power in Section 92. . . . the
existence of any other power to act as an insurance agent [is nonexistent]." Id. at 1014.
86. Id. at 1013.
87. Id.
88. Saxon v. Georgia Ass'n of Indep. Ins. Agents, Inc., 399 F.2d 1010, 1014 (5th Cir. 1968)
(quoting the Eighth Circuit in Service Life Ins. Co. v. United States, 293 F.2d 72 (8th Cir. 1961)).
89. Id. at 1013 (citing the OCC's 1916 letter to Congress, stating that "[i]t is certainly clear
that the Comptroller of the Currency has no right to authorize or permit a national bank to exercise
powers not conferred upon it by law"). The court reasoned that Comptroller Saxon had extended
his bounds by issuing an Administrative Ruling in an area over which he had no legal authority.
Id.
90. Id.
91. Id. at 1015. The court reasoned that there could be no reasonable doubt as to the meaning
of section 92. Id.
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2. Section 92 as an Aid to The National Banks
Despite its defeat in Saxon, the OCC continued to interpret banking
legislation expansively.' 2 For example, in 1983, a leading OCC attorney
responded to an inquiry from the Commerce Department by asserting that
section 92 does not limit the geographic locations of customers buying insurance
from national banks operating under section 92. 3 In 1984, the United States
National Bank of Oregon (NBO) wrote the OCC requesting to sell insurance in
accordance with the OCC's earlier letter to the Commerce Department.' The
OCC instructed NBO to wait until the OCC could review the policy implications
of allowing nationally chartered banks to sell insurance without geographic
limitations.9'
In 1986, the OCC formally interpreted section 92 to allow national banks
operating under section 92 to sell insurance without geographic limitations.'
Consequently, the OCC permitted NBO to sell insurance to its customers in
towns with populations more than 5000 people out of a branch located in Banks,
Oregon, which had a population of less than 5000 people.'e Insurance industry
agents immediately filed suit against the Comptroller of the Currency in the case
of the National Ass'n of Life Underwriters v. Clarke.9" In Clarke, the United
States District Court for the District of Columbia Circuit followed the Supreme
Court's test for determining the validity of an agency's statutory interpretation

92. See, e.g., OCC Inter. Ltr. 623 [1993-1994 Transfer Binder] Fed. Banking L. Rep. (CCH)
83,505 (Sept. 24, 1993) (determining that national banks could sell annuity products under the
National Bank Act's incidental powers provision); OCC Inter. Ltr. 366 [1985-1987 Transfer Binder]
Fed. Banking L. Rep. (CCH) 85,536 (Aug. 18, 1986) (determining that national banks could sell
insurance under section 92 without geographic limitations).
93. Independent Ins. Agents of Am., Inc. v. Ludwig, 997 F.2d 958, 959 (D.C. Cir. 1993).
The OCC's letter was written by a senior OCC attorney, Debra A. Chong, of the OCC's San
Francisco office. Id. In her letter, Ms. Chong asserted that a small town bank could sell insurance
.without geographic restriction to the community [in which] it is located." Id. (quoting Debra A.
Chong).
94. Id.
95. Id.
96. Id. In the OCC's letter to NBO, it stated that "[biased on our analysis of the relevant legal
precedent, we have concluded that Ms. Chong correctly determined that a national bank or its branch
which is located in a place of 5000 or under population may sell insurance to existing and potential
customers located anywhere." OCC Inter. Ltr. 366 [1985-1987 Transfer Binder] Fed. Banking L.
Rep. (CCH) 1 85,536 (Aug. 18, 1986). In support of this position, the OCC wrote that "[S]ection
Id.
92 does not directly address geographic limitations .. ..
97. Ludwig, 997 F.2d at 959.
98. 736 F. Supp. 1162 (D.C. Cir. 1990), rev'd sub nom., Independent Ins. Agents of Am., Inc.
v. Clarke, 955 F.2d 731 (D.C. Cir. 1992), rev'd and remandedfor review of originaljudgment sub
nom., United States Nat'l Bank of Or. v. Independent Ins. Agents of Am., Inc., 508 U.S. 439
(1993), originaljudgment aff'd sub nom., Independent Ins. Agents of Am., Inc. v. Ludwig, 997
F.2d 958 (D.C. Cir. 1993).

1
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developed in Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. National Resources Defense Council,
Inc. 99 In Chevron, the Court determined that the Environmental Protection
Agency's interpretation of the Clean Air Act was reasonable."o
The test developed in Chevron for determining the reasonableness of a
federal administrative agency's interpretation utilizes a two-pronged inquiry." 1
Under the first prong, if Congress has expressed a clear intent on the precise
issue in question, then the court must give effect to that unambiguously
expressed intent of Congress.'0 2 However, if the statute is silent or ambiguous
on the particular issue, then the court must only ask whether the agency's
interpretation was reasonable.' 03
After reviewing the language of section 92, the Clarke court concluded that
Congress had not spoken directly to the precise issue of whether national banks
operating under section 92 could sell insurance to customers located outside of

99. 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
100. Id. at 866. In Chevron, the Supreme Court reviewed a set of Environmental Protection
Agency (EPA) rules that interpreted terms in the Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401-7642 (1994 &
Supp. I. 1995). Id. at 841. At the District of Columbia Circuit, the EPA's interpretation was
replaced with that of the court. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. Gorsuch, 685 F.2d 718,
728 (D.C. Cir. 1982). The Supreme Court reversed that decision, finding that the EPA's regulations
were a reasonable interpretation of the Clean Air Act since Congress had expressed no specific intent
with respect to that precise issue. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 866. In its opinion, the Supreme Court
chastised the District of Columbia Circuit for failing to defer to the EPA. Cynthia R. Farina,
Statutory Interpretationand the Balance of Power in the Administrative State, 89 COLUM. L. REV.
452, 456 (1989).
The Chevron decision is important because it overruled the prevailing rule that courts could
replace an agency's interpretation with one of their own. Robert A. Anthony, Which Agency
InterpretationsShould Get JudicialDeference?, 40 ADMIN. L. REV. 121, 122 (1988); Cass R.
Sunstein, Law and Administration After Chevron, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 2071, 2074 (1990); Robert
A. Anthony, Which Agency InterpretationsShould Bind Citizens and Courts?, 7 YALE J. ON REG.
1, 6 (1990). Further, subsequent cases have expanded the Chevron doctrine of judicial deference.
Jonathon Bloomberg, Note, The Chevron Legacy: Young v. Community Nutrition Institute
Compounds the Confusion, 73 CORNELL L. REv. 113, 129 (1988); Bernard Schwartz, Administrative
Law Cases During 1991, 44 ADMIN. L. REv. 629, 635 (1992) (noting that subsequent cases have
extended the judicial deference given to include agency rulemaking).
101. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842-44. Generally, the Chevron test provides that where a statute
is silent or ambiguous on a specific issue, the courts must defer to the interpretation given by the
administrator of the agency with the authority to enforce the statute. Id. at 843. Deference by the
court is required unless the interpretation is arbitrary, capricious, or manifestly contrary to the intent
of the statute. Id. For a complete discussion of the two-part Chevron analysis, see Denise W.
DeFranco, Chevron and Canons of Statutory Construction, 58 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 829, 829
(1990).
102. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842-43.
103. Id. at 843.
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those small towns."°4 Specifically, the language of section 92 does not address
customers. O' Based upon this silence, the Clarke court then asked whether
the OCC's interpretation was reasonable." °6 The insurance agents argued that
the OCC's interpretation was not reasonable in light of section 92's legislative
intent. Despite the insurance agents' argument, however, the court exercised
great judicial discretion and found in favor of the Comptroller of the
Currency.'O° The court reasoned that the OCC provided a cogent explanation
as to why it interpreted section 92 to provide no geographic limitations on the
customers of small town national banks.'08
The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit
affirmed the decision of the district court." ° The court reasoned that the
OCC's interpretation of section 92 was reasonable because section 92 was
ambiguous in regard to the locations of present and future customers. " 0 Thus,
the OCC was permitted to expand the scope of section 92 to include insurance
sales to customers located in towns larger than 5000 people."' Further, the
District of Columbia Circuit's expansion of section 92 in Clarke has been
followed by the Seventh Circuit.11 2 These cases are representative of a recent
trend since the Supreme Court's decision in Chevron toward broad judicial
deference by the courts to the interpretations of various federal agencies,
including the Comptroller's office." 3
In 1995, the Supreme Court added support to the OCC's power in the case
of NationsBank of North Carolinav. Variable Annuity Life Insurance Co."'
In the unanimous NationsBank opinion, the Court upheld the OCC's

104. National Ass'n of Life Underwriters v. Clarke, 736 F. Supp. 1162, 1168 (D.C. Cir.
1990). The court, reading the language of section 92, concluded that the statute says little
concerning how the banks' powers to sell insurance are to be exercised. Id. The court added that
section 92's silence coupled with its express rulemaking authority in the OCC "suggests that
Congress explicitly 'left a gap for the [Comptroller] to fill.'" Id. (quoting Chevron, 467 U.S. at
843).
105. 12 U.S.C. § 92 (1994).
106. Clarke, 736 F. Supp. at 1170. The court restated the second step of the Chevron rule as
follows: "we must defer to any reasonable interpretation by the Comptroller on [this] issue." Id.
107. Id. The court rejected the agents' contention that the OCC's interpretation was
unreasonable in light of the legislative intent of section 92. Id.
108. Id. at 1173 (quoting King Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 860 F.2d 465, 470 (D.C. Cir.
1988)).
109. Independent Ins. Agents of Am., Inc. v. Ludwig, 997 F.2d 958 (D.C. Cir. 1993).
110. Id. at 960. The court noted that "Congress knew how to impose geographic restrictions
when it wanted to." Id. (quoting the district court's earlier opinion in Clarke).
111. Id. at962.
112. NBD Bank v. Bennett, 67 F.3d 629 (7th Cir. 1995).
113. For a thorough discussion of the recent trends following the Chevron decision, see
generally Bloomberg, supra note 100.
114. 115 S. Ct. 810 (1995).
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interpretation of the National Bank Act to allow national banks to sell
annuities." 5 The shocking speed and force of the NationsBank decision sent
a message concerning the OCC's power to expansively interpret the National
Bank Act.

116

In NationsBank, the OCC permitted national banks to sell variable
annuities." 7 Prior to NationsBank, variable annuities were sold only by the
insurance industry."'
The NationsBank Court agreed with the OCC's
interpretation that these annuities should be categorized as investments and not
insurance, despite the fact that this is not expressly stated in the National Bank
Act." 9 As a result of the NationsBank categorization, annuities were not
confined to the limits of section 92 like insurance products."12
When read together, the Clarke and NationsBank decisions represent a trend
toward judicial deference to the OCC's interpretations of the National Bank
Act.'
This deference has allowed the OCC to extend the scope of section 92
beyond the original intentions of that Act. 22
' For that reason, Congress should

115. Id. at 817. In NationsBank, the Court addressed the precise issue of whether the
Comptroller's decision allowing banks to sell annuities was in accordance with the National Bank
Act. Id. at 812. The Comptroller based his opinion on the reasoning that annuities are investment
products. OCC Inter. Ltr. 366 [1985-1987 Transfer Binder] Fed. Banking L. Rep. (CCH) 85,536
(Aug. 18, 1986).
116. Brian W. Smith et al., Annuities Ruling Boosts Business Opportunities, But Uncertainty
Lingers, BANKING POL'Y REP., Apr. 17, 1995, at 1 (noting that the NationsBank decision surprised
banking industry observers due to its speed and force). The Court decided the case merely six
weeks after the oral arguments were heard. Roderer & Steinman, supra note 5, at 396. The
decision demonstrated the Court's forcefulness in that the decision was unanimous. Id.
117. NationsBank, 115 S. Ct. at 812. In determining that federal law permits such annuity
sales as a service to bank customers, the Comptroller concluded that annuities are investment
products rather than insurance products. Id. Therefore, annuities were not covered under the
restrictions of section 92 of the National Bank Act. Id.
118. Id.
119. Id. at 814. Justice Ginsburg authored the opinion and wrote that the Comptroller is
"charged by the Congress with superintendence of national banks." Id. at 812. Consequently, the
NationsBank opinion upheld the Comptroller's interpretation of annuities as a reasonable
interpretation of the National Bank Act and therefore, worthy of deference by the courts. Id. at 814.
120. NationsBank of N.C. v. Variable Annuity Life Ins. Co., 115 S. Ct. 810, 814 (1995).
121. See, e.g., Roderer & Steinman, supra note 5, at 396 (reasoning that the NationsBank
decision afforded sweeping deference to the Comptroller's power to interpret the National Bank
Act); Smith et al., supra note 116, at 1 (noting that the deference displayed by the NationsBank
Court should create new business opportunities for banking organizations). See supra note 100 and
accompanying text for a discussion of how the Chevron doctrine is continuing to expand the scope
of judicial deference.
122. The OCC has interpreted section 92 to permit statewide insurance sales by banks properly
located and doing business in cities with less than 5000 people. OCC Inter. Ltr. 366 [1985-1987
Transfer Binder] Fed. Banking L. Rep. (CCH)
85,536 (Aug. 18, 1986). In contrast, the
legislative history behind the enactment of section 92 suggests that it was enacted only to aid small
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amend section 92 to restore its scope to coincide with Congress' original
intentions. 13
In the conflict between section 92 and state anti-affiliation statutes
authorized under the McCarran-Ferguson Act, the OCC argued that section 92
should prevail.' 24 To support this decision, the OCC interpreted section 92
as allowing insurance sales even though the net result went beyond the actual
This interpretation of section 92 preempts the
language of that text."z
anti-affiliation statutes, and as a result, the insurance industry's ability to
regulate the business of insurance has greatly diminished.' 26 That result
contradicts the legislative intent behind the enactment of the McCarran-Ferguson
Act. 127
C. The McCarran-FergusonAct
Traditionally, the duty of regulating the insurance industry in the United
States has been left to the individual states.' 28 The Supreme Court's initial

town banks that were located in towns of less than 5000. 53 CONG. REC. 11,001 (1916). The
OCC's recent interpretation does not appear to coincide with Congress' original intentions for section
92.
123. When a statute's language begins to create confusion and loopholes, then it is Congress'
role to fix the statute's language. Independent Ins. Agents of Am., Inc. v. Ludwig, 997 F.2d 958,
961 (D.C. Cir. 1993).
124. Brief of Amicus Curiae United States and the Comptroller of the Currency in Support of
Petitioner, Barnett Bank of Marion County v. Nelson, 116 S. Ct. 39 (1995) (No. 94-1837). The
OCC argues that "Florida's prohibition on insurance agency activities by bank affiliates conflicts
with 12 U.S.C. 92's authorization of such activities by certain national banks." Id. at 5. "The court
of appeals erred in concluding that the McCarran-Ferguson Act . . . saves the state law from
preemption." Id.
125. See supra note 96 for the OCC's intrepretation of the National Bank Act which gives rise
to this result.
126. A victory for the banking industry will turn the McCarran-Ferguson Act and the several
states' abilities to regulate insurance into Swiss cheese. Mark A. Hofmann, Hopingfor Favorable
Outcome But Foresee Alternative Scenarios, BUS. INS., Feb. 5, 1996, at 32J.
127. The McCarran-Ferguson Act was created by Congress to return the power to regulate and
tax the insurance industry to the several states. See, e.g., Prudential Ins. Co. v. Benjamin, 328 U.S.
408, 429 (1946). If the national banks are allowed to sell insurance on a statewide basis beyond the
reach of the McCarran-Ferguson Act, then the Act's purpose will be diminished. For a full
discussion of the McCarran-Ferguson Act and its purposes, see infra notes 128-44 and accompanying
text.
128. See, e.g., Charles R. McGuire, Regulation of the InsuranceIndustry After Hartford Fire
Ins. v. California: The McCarran-FergusonAct and Antitrust Policies, 25 LoY. U. CHI. L.J. 303,
304 (1994); John L. Ingersoll et al., FederalRegulation of Insurance: The Industry's Response to
H.R. 4900 and H.R. 1290, 23 A.B.A. BRIEF 10, 10 (1994).
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interpretation of the Commerce Clause'29 precluded the federal government
from regulating the insurance industry until 1944 when the Court decided the
case of United States v. South-Eastern UnderwritersAss'n. 13 In that case, the
Court held that the business of insurance was "commerce" within the meaning
of the Commerce Clause.' 3' As a result, the insurance industry could be
32
regulated by the federal government.
However, in 1945, one year following the Court's ruling in South-Eastern
Underwriters,33 Congress passed the McCarran-Ferguson Act. 134 This Act

129. See Paul v. Virginia, 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 168, 183-85 (1868) (holding that insurance
contracts are "local transactions ... governed by the local law"). The Paul Court explained its
refusal to characterize insurance contracts as commerce by stating:
These contracts are not articles of commerce in any proper meaning of the word. They
are not subjects of trade and barter offered in the market as something having an
existence and value independent of the parties to them. They are not commodities to
be shipped or forwarded from one State to another, and then put up for sale. They are
like other personal contracts between parties which are completed by their signature and
the transfer of the consideration. Such contracts are not inter-state transactions, though
the parties may be domiciled in different States.
Id. at 183.
For other cases supporting the Paul decision, see, e.g., New York Life Ins. Co. v. Deer
Lodge County, 231 U.S. 495, 510 (1913) (holding that the business of insurance involves neither
state nor interstate commerce); Hooper v. California, 155 U.S. 648, 655 (1895) (holding that "[tlhe
business of insurance is not commerce").
130. 322 U.S. 533, 553 (1944) (noting that "[n]o commercial enterprise of any kind which
conducts its activities across state lines has been held to be wholly beyond the regulatory power of
Congress under the Commerce Clause").
In South-Eastern Underwriters, the Court noted that in every case in which it had held that
"the business of insurance is not commerce," it had been faced with the issue of the validity of a
state statute regulating the insurance industry. Id. at 544. In fact, the Court had never before
addressed the validity of an attempt by Congress to regulate the insurance industry. Id.
Accordingly, the Court noted that its prior characteristics of insurance as outside the scope of
.commerce" had occurred in cases where the Court was evaluating state rather than federal
regulations, and observed that such characterizations were "inconsistent with many decisions of (the]
Court which have upheld federal statutes regulating interstate commerce under the Commerce
Clause." Id. at 545.
131. Id. at 553.
132. Id.
133. Id.
134. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1011-1015 (1994). The current version of the McCarran-Ferguson Act
provides in pertinent part:
§1011. Declarations of policy
Congress hereby declares that the continued regulation and taxation by the several States
of the business of insurance is in the public interest, and that silence on the part of
Congress shall not be construed to impose any barrier to the regulation or taxation of
such business by the several states.
§ 1012. Regulation by State Law
(a) The business of insurance, and every person engaged therein, shall be subject
to the laws of the several States which relate to the regulation or taxation of such
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expressly overruled the South-Eastern Underwriters decision and declared that
the "continued regulation and taxation by the several States of the business of
insurance is in the public interest." 135
The adoption of the McCarranFerguson Act was based in large part on the recommendation of the National
Association of Insurance Commissioners (NAIC).'36 According to the NAIC,
the original purpose of the McCarran-Ferguson Act was to preserve the state
operated regulatory system of the insurance industry. 37 The Supreme Court
has acknowledged the purpose put forth by the NAIC as the valid intent of
Congress for passing the McCarran-Ferguson Act.' 38
Specifically, the congressional intent behind the McCarran-Ferguson Act
clearly aspires to create a limited exception to the basic constitutional policy of
economic federalism. To accomplish its purpose, the McCarran-Ferguson Act
established a two-prong test that must be met before a state insurance statute
receives immunity from federal preemption. 139 First, the state statute must
"regulate the business of insurance" to fit within the scope of the

business.
(b) No Act of Congress shall be construed to invalidate, impair, or supersede any
law enacted by any State for the purpose of regulating the business of insurance, or
which imposes a fee or tax upon such business, unless such Act specifically relates to
the business of insurance ....
135. Id.
136. See, e.g., McGuire, supra note 128, at 311 (noting that Congress passed the
McCarran-Ferguson Act due in large part to the aggressive lobbying of NAIC). Since NAIC's
inception, it has played an increasingly important role in the formulation of insurance regulations
and policies. David G. Stebing, Insurance Regulation in Alaska: Healthy Exercise of a State
Prerogative, 10 ALASKA L. REV. 279, 288 (1993). The NAIC is comprised of the chief insurance
regulatory officials of the several states. Id. at 288 n.41. Throughout its history, the NAIC has
provided valuable national leadership in regulating the insurance industry. How InsuranceLaws Are
Made: The NAIC and State Adoption of NAIC Model Laws: Hearings on the Nat'l Ass'n of Ins.
Comm'rs Before the Subcomm. on Antitrust, Monopolies, and Business Rights of the Senate Comm.
on the Judiciary, 102d Cong. 2 (1991) (statement of Sen. Howard M. Metzenbaum).
137. "[The lIegislative history of the McCarran-Ferguson Act indicates that the Act was
intended to preserve state insurance laws and regulations." Brief of Amicus Curiae National
Association of Insurance Commissioners in Support of Respondents at 4, Barnett Bank of Marion
County v. Nelson, 116 S. Ct. 39 (1996) (No. 94-1837) (relying on 1945 NAIC PROC. 156, at 159
and the case Group Life & Health Insurance Co. v. Royal Drug Co., 440 U.S. 205, 208 (1979)).
138. Prudential Ins. Co. v. Benjamin, 328 U.S. 408 (1946). One year after the enactment of
the McCarran-Ferguson Act, the Supreme Court in Prudentialdescribed the Act's purpose as:
Obviously Congress' purpose was broadly to give support to the existing and future state
systems for regulating and taxing the business of insurance. This was done . . . by
declaring expressly and affirmatively that continued state regulation and taxation of this
business is in the public interest and that the business and all who engage in it "shall be
subject to" the laws of the several states in these respects.
Id. at 429-30.
139. Barnett Bank of Marion County v. Gallagher, 43 F.3d 631, 634 (1lth Cir. 1995);
Owensboro Nat'l Bank v. Stephens, 44 F.3d 388, 390 (6th Cir. 1994).
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McCarran-Ferguson Act." 4 Second, even if the state statute satisfies the first
requirement, the federal statute will control, and consequently preempt the state
statute, if the federal statute "specifically relates to the business of
insurance.".141
The Sixth and Eleventh Circuits both applied the two-part McCarranFerguson test to evaluate conflicts between section 92 and two similar state
anti-affiliation statutes.' 42 Under similar facts, however, the two circuits
arrived at opposite conclusions. 4 3 Likewise, the Supreme Court also utilized
the McCarran-Ferguson test in the case of Barnett.'" Thus, a critical analysis
of those cases is necessary to illustrate that only a congressional amendment will
solve this conflict in accordance with Congress' original intentions for enacting
section 92 and the McCarran-Ferguson Act.
III. A

CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF JUDICIAL ATTEMPTS TO SOLVE THE CURRENT
CONFLICT BETWEEN SECTION 92 AND THE
MCCARRAN-FERGUSON ACT

Both the Sixth and Eleventh Circuits have struggled with the conflict
between section 92 and state anti-affiliation statutes. 45 The two circuits
applied slightly different analyses for the first prong of the McCarran-Ferguson
test concerning the definition of insurance and consequently arrived at opposite
conclusions.'" The Sixth and Eleventh Circuits focused primarily on the
semantics of section 92 and the McCarran-Ferguson Act rather than Congress'

140. 15 U.S.C. § 1012(b) (1994).
141. Id.
142. Barnett, 43 F.3d at 634 (evaluating the preemption problem between Florida's
anti-affiliation statute and section 92 using the McCarran-Ferguson test); Owensboro, 44 F.3d at
391 (using the two-pronged McCarran-Ferguson test to evaluate a conflict between Kentucky's
anti-affiliation statute and section 92).
143. Barnett, 43 F.3d at 637 (holding that Florida's anti-affiliation statute preempted section
92 under the McCarran-Ferguson test); Owensboro, 44 F.3d at 389 (holding that the federal law,
section 92, preempts Kentucky's state anti-affiliation statute).
144. Barnett Bank of Marion County v. Nelson, 116 S. Ct. 1103, 1112 (1996).
145. Barnett Bank of Marion County v. Gallagher, 43 F.3d 631 (11 th Cir. 1995) (addressing
whether Florida's anti-affiliation statute could preempt section 92 through the doctrine of reverse
preemption); Owensboro Nat'l Bank v. Stephens, 44 F.3d 388 (6th Cir. 1994) (addressing a conflict
between Kentucky's anti-affiliation statute and section 92).
146. The Owensboro court relied on two Supreme Court cases to analyze the first prong of the
McCarran-Ferguson test. Owensboro, 44 F.3d at 391-93 (relying on Union Labor Life Insurance
Co. v. Pireno, 458 U.S. 119 (1982), and United States Department of Treasury v. Fabe, 508 U.S.
491 (1993)). In contrast, the Barnett court relied solely upon the Fabe decision in its analysis of
the first prong of the McCarran-Ferguson test. Barnett, 43 F.3d at 634-36. Further, the Barnett
and Owensboro decisions arrived at opposite conclusions. State Attacks, supra note 43, at 2;
McCullough, supra note 3, at 72; Meyer, supra note 9, at 8.
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original intentions for enacting those statutes.' 47 The detailed analysis of those
decisions provided in the following sections will demonstrate the fundamental
need for a congressional amendment that will clarify section 92's language.
A. The Sixth Circuit'sAttempted Resolution of the Conflict
In 1994, the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit held in
the case of Owensboro National Bank v. Stephens 4 ' that section 92 preempted
Kentucky's anti-affiliation statute (section 287). "' For nationally chartered
banks, the preemption of section 287 by section 92 meant that the state laws of
Kentucky could not stop them from exercising their section 92 insurance
powers.15 0 Further, under the expansive OCC interpretations of section 92
upheld by the District of Columbia Circuit in Clarke, nationally chartered banks
could use their section 92 insurance powers to sell insurance on a statewide
basis.'
Thus, whether Kentucky's anti-affiliation statute could stop national
banks from exercising their section 92 insurance powers had the potential to
affect Kentucky's entire insurance market."'

147. See Owensboro, 44 F.3d at 388 (focusing its analysis on the first prong of the
McCarran-Ferguson test by incorporating a combination of definitions); Barnett, 43 F.3d at 636-37
(addressing only the procedural history behind section 92).
148. Owensboro, 44 F.3d at 389.
149. KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 287.030(4) (Banks-Baldwin 1996). Section 287 provides:
No person who after July 13, 1984, owns or acquires more than one-half (1/2) of the
capital stock of a bank shall act as insurance agent or broker with respect to any
insurance except credit life insurance, credit health insurance, insurance of the interest
of real property mortgagee in mortgage property, other than title insurance.
Id.
150. See Toby Roth, Perfect Time for a New Banking Era, WALL ST. J., Jan. 16, 1996, at A 14
(noting that a victory for the insurance industry in the Barnett battle would allow states to block
national banks from selling insurance nationwide). See also Jaret Seiberg, Comptroller, States
Aiming for Accord on Insurance Sales Series, AM. BANKER, Jan. 11, 1996, at 1 (noting that the
Justices in the Barnett case were asked to decide whether the McCarran-Ferguson Act gives the
states authority to completely exclude national banks from the insurance industry through
anti-affiliation statutes).
151. National Ass'n of Life Underwriters v. Clarke, 736 F. Supp. 1162 (D.C. Cir. 1990), rev'd
sub nom., Independent Ins. Agents of Am., Inc. v. Clarke, 955 F.2d 731 (D.C. Cir. 1992), rev'd
and remanded for review of original judgment sub nom., United States Nat'l Bank of Or. v.
Independent Ins. Agents of Am., Inc., 508 U.S. 439 (1993), original judgment aff'd sub nom.,
Independent Ins. Agents of Am., Inc. v. Ludwig, 997 F.2d 958 (D.C. Cir. 1993). See supra note
96 and accompanying text for the pertinent portions of the OCC letter authorizing national bank
insurance sales on a statewide basis.
152. The OCC has given national banks the go-ahead on selling insurance out of their small
town offices on a statewide basis. OCC Inter. Ltr. 366 [1985-1987 Transfer Binder] Fed. Banking
L. Rep. (CCH) 85,536 (Aug. 18, 1986). This interpretation has been upheld in the circuit courts.
Ludwig, 997 F.2d at 957; NBD Bank v. Bennett, 67 F.3d 629 (7th Cir. 1995).
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The Owensboro court addressed the precise issue of whether Kentucky's
anti-affiliation statute, section 287, could preempt section 92.1 3 The court's
analysis relied on the two-pronged test developed from the language of the
McCarran-Ferguson Act.15
Under that test, the first consideration was
whether section 287 was enacted for the purpose of regulating the business of
insurance. 55 The court broke that inquiry down further
into two elements: the
56
business of insurance and the purpose of enactment.
The Owensboro court first addressed the "business of insurance" element
by using the working definition developed by the Supreme Court in Union Labor
Life Insurance Co. v. Pireno.157 In Pireno, an antitrust action was brought
against a health insurance association for utilizing rates pre-set by an insurance
commission.5 5 The Pireno Court held that the health insurer was not exempt
from liability under the McCarran-Ferguson Act because the insurer's actions
did not constitute the "business of insurance."' 59 The Court reasoned that

153. Owensboro Nat'l Bank v. Stephens, 44 F.3d 388, 389 (6th Cir. 1994). The court first
dismissed the insurance industry's contention that ordinary preemption could not apply in this case
because the laws do not actually conflict. Id. at 390-91. Next, the court addressed whether the
McCarran-Ferguson Act could save Kentucky's anti-affiliation statute from preemption. Id. at 391.
154. Id. The court stated that "[Section 287] is not preempted by § 92 if (1) Section 287 was
'enacted . . . for the purpose of regulating the business of insurance,' and (2) § 92 does not
'specifically relatel] to the business of insurance.'"
Id. (quoting the language of the
McCarran-Ferguson Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1012(b)).
155. Id.
156. Owensboro, 44 F.3d at 391. The first prong of the McCarran-Ferguson analysis asks
whether the state insurance law was enacted for the purpose of regulating the "business of
insurance." 15 U.S.C. § 1012(b) (1994). The Owensboro court addressed this prong in two steps.
Owensboro, 44 F.3d at 391. First, the court analyzed whether Kentucky's anti-affiliation statute
should be categorized within the business of insurance. Id. at 391-92. Second, the court addressed
whether Kentucky's statute was enacted with the necessary purpose element to pass the
McCarran-Ferguson test. Id. at 392.
157. 458 U.S. 119, 127-29 (1982).
158. Id. at 123. The basis of the action brought against the health insurance company was that
the practice of using rates set by an insurance commission stifled competition. Id. Thus, the claim
was based upon federal antitrust law. Id. at 124.
159. Id. at 134. The Court developed three criteria for determining when an activity or practice
is in the business of insurance. Id. at 129. Those criteria were "first, whether the practice has the
effect of transferring or spreading a policyholder's risk; second, whether the practice is an integral
part of the policy relationship between the insurer and insured; and third, whether the practice is
limited to entities within the insurance industry." Id.
These criteria for defining the business of insurance in an antitrust context are much more
narrow than the other contexts in which the McCarran-Ferguson Act requires an activity or statute
to be in the business of insurance. T. Richard Kennedy, The McCarranAct: A Limited "Business
of Insurance" Antitrust Exemption Made Even Narrower-ThreeRecent Decisions, 18 FORUM 528,
529 (1983); Eric Peter Gillet, The Business of Insurance: Exemption, Exemption, Who Has the
Antitrust Exemption, 17 PAC. L.J. 261, 272 (1985). Note, the Owensboro case did not occur in the
antitrust context. Owensboro Nat'l Bank v. Stephens, 44 F.3d 388,394 (6th Cir. 1994) (Batchelder,
J., dissenting).
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Congress' intention for enacting the antitrust section of the McCarran-Ferguson
Act was to create a narrow exception to the federal antitrust laws. " Thus,
the Pireno Court's definition of the "business of insurance" used by the
Owensboro court was very narrow in scope.'
The Owensboro court next addressed the "purpose" element of the
McCarran-Ferguson test using the Supreme Court's decision in United States
Department of Treasury v. Fabe.62 The Fabe Court stated that laws are
enacted for the "purpose" of regulating the business of insurance when they
possess the intention or aim of adjusting, managing, or controlling the business
of insurance.'" The Owensboro court used the Fabe criteria in conjunction
with the Pireno Court's definition of the "business of insurance" to form a
hybrid test for applying the first prong of the McCarran-Ferguson test.1' The
Owensboro Court's hybrid issue asked whether Section 287 "possess[ed] the aim
of regulating activities that [met] the Pireno criteria."'" The court held that
Kentucky's anti-affiliation statute did not possess the required aim and,
therefore, was not protected by the McCarran-Ferguson Act.66 The court
noted that section 287 merely excluded the participation of banks in the
insurance industry. 67 The court reasoned that excluding participation in an
activity is different than regulating the manner in which the activity is
conducted. 61 Thus, Kentucky's anti-affiliation statute was not a regulation of
the "business of insurance." 69
Since the Owensboro court concluded that section 287 was enacted to
regulate the banking industry and not the business of insurance, it failed the first
prong of the McCarran-Ferguson test.' 70 Thus, section 92 preempted section
287.17l
As a result, Kentucky was unable to stop national banks from

160. Pireno, 458 U.S. at 129. The antitrust laws referred to in Pirenoare part of the Sherman
Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (1994).
161. See Kennedy, supra note 159, at 529. Prior to Pireno, many scholars predicted that the
phrase "business of insurance" would be read broadly by the Court. Id. at 528-29.

162. 508 U.S. 491 (1993).
163. Id. at 505.

164. Id.
165. Owensboro Nat'l Bank v. Stephens, 44 F.3d 388, 392 (6th Cir. 1994).
166. Id.

167. Id. Thus, Kentucky's anti-affiliation statute failed to meet Pireno's narrow definition of
the business of insurance. Id.
168. Id.
169. Id.
170. Id.
171. Owensboro Nat'l Bank v. Stephens, 44 F.3d 388, 392 (6th Cir. 1994).
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exercising their section 92 insurance powers.' 7 These powers included the
ability to sell insurance to customers without geographic limitation.73

The decision reached by the Owensboro majority is flawed for two reasons.
First, the court's result contradicted Congress' intentions for both section 92 and
the McCarran-Ferguson Act as represented by their legislative backgrounds. 74
Second, as the Owensboro dissent pointed out, the court erred in using the
Pireno criteria to determine whether the practices and activities of section 287
pertained to the "business of insurance. " " The following Sections will
examine these flaws in detail.
1. The Owensboro Decision Ignored the Historical and Legislative Backgrounds
of Both Section 92 and the McCarran-Ferguson Act
Although the court acknowledged the essential role of section 92 and the
McCarran-Ferguson Act in the resolution of this conflict, the court's final
decision contradicted the historical and legislative backgrounds of both Acts. 76
The court's opinion concentrated on the semantics concerning which test was the
most appropriate to use in resolving this conflict." 7
As a result, the
Owensboro decision contradicted the congressional purpose of section 92 and the
McCarran-Ferguson Act. 78
The original purpose behind section 92 dates back to 1916 when the
Comptroller of the Currency informed Congress of the problems that nationally
chartered banks were having in small towns. 79 Due to the low local deposits
received by small-town banks, they were forced to charge overly high interest

172. See Roth, supra note 150, at A14 ("If banks win, national banks would be allowed to sell
insurance from coast to coast."); Seiberg, supranote 150, at I (noting that a defeat for the insurance
industry would mean the inevitable sale of insurance by banks).
173. The OCC currently allows national banks to sell insurance out of their small town offices
without concern over the geographic locations of their customers. OCC Inter. Ltr. 366 [1985-1987
Transfer Binder] Fed. Banking L. Rep. (CCH) 85,536 (Aug. 18, 1986).
174. See infra notes 176-198 and accompanying text for a comparison of the Owensboro
decision's result with the original intentions for the enactment of section 92 and. the
McCarran-Ferguson Act.
175. Owensboro, 44 F.3d at 393 (Batchelder, J., dissenting). The dissent noted that Pirenowas
developed for use with antitrust fact patters. Id. at 394-95. The Owensboro case did not present
antitrust facts. Id.
176. See infra notes 185-99 and accompanying text.
177. Owensboro Nat'l Bank v. Stephens, 44 F.3d 388, 391-92 (6th Cir. 1994). The court's
analysis of the McCarran-Ferguson test involved a detailed discussion distinguishing the definition
of the business of insurance used in Pireno versus the definition used in Fabe. Id.
178. See infra notes 185-212 and accompanying text.
179. 53 CONG. REC. 11,001 (1916). For a full discussion of the historical and legislative
background of section 92, see supra notes 54-71 and accompanying text.
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rates."W The Comptroller suggested that allowing the small-town banks to
supplement their incomes with insurance sales would offset the problems caused
by the low deposits.' 8' The Comptroller also noted the persuasive public
policy reasons for limiting the national banks' abilities to sell insurance to "small
communities." " Congress enacted the law recommended by the Comptroller
as part of the Act of September 7, 1916. " That law is commonly referred
to as section 92 of the National Bank Act."
The Owensboro court's final decision was flawed because it contradicted
Congress' purpose for enacting section 92. "a Congress enacted section 92 to
aid the struggling small-town national banks.' 6 In contrast, the result obtained
in Owensboro allows large national banks to sell insurance through their
branches located in small towns to customers in any location." s This result
of statewide insurance sales thwarts the public policy reasons initially stated for
limiting banks' abilities to sell insurance under the section 92 exception.'

180. 53 CONG. REC. 11,001 (1916).
181. Id.
182. Id.
183. Ch. 461, 39 Stat. 750, 753 (1916).
184. Barnett Bank of Marion County v. Nelson, 116 S. Ct. 1103, 1110 (1996).
185. The legislative history behind the enactment of section 92 demonstrates that it was enacted
for the specific purpose of aiding small town national banks. 53 CONG. REc. 11,001 (1916). In
contrast, the Owensboro decision allowed national banks located in Kentucky to operate out of their
small towns on a statewide basis due to the OCC's expansive interpretation of section 92. OCC
Inter. Ltr. 366 [1985-1987 Transfer Binder] Fed. Banking L. Rep. (CCH) 85,536 (Aug. 18,
1986). Thus, the result reached by the Owensboro court does not appear to coincide with Congress'
original purpose for enacting section 92.
186. 53 CONG. REc. 11,001 (1916).
187. The result in Owensboro allowed national banks in Kentucky to use their section 92
insurance powers despite state laws to the contrary. See generally Roth, supra note 150, at A14;
Seiberg, supra note 150, at 1. Further, the OCC has interpreted section 92 to allow national banks
operating under section 92 to sell insurance outside of their small towns without geographic
limitations. OCC Inter. Ltr. 366 [1985-1987 Transfer Binder] Fed. Banking L. Rep. (CCH)
85,536 (Aug. 18, 1986).
188. The general rule is that national banks are not authorized under the National Bank Act to
sell insurance. Saxon v. Georgia Ass'n of Indep. Ins. Agents, Inc., 399 F.2d 1010, 1013 (5th Cir.
1968). Section 92 was enacted as an exception to that general rule. 53 CONG. REG. 11,001 (1916).
The public policy concerns behind the enactment of section 92 illustrated a fear that some national
banks would soon fail simply because they were located in small towns. Id. Nowhere in the
Comptroller's 1916 letter to Congress does it mention allowing national banks to sell on a statewide
basis. Id. "In contrast, the Comptroller wrote that '[i]t
seems pretty desirable from the standpoint
of public policy and banking efficiency that this authority should be limited to banks in small
communities." Id. In contrast, the Owensboro decision allows national banks to exercise insurance
sales outside of the small communities discussed in the Comptroller's 1916 letter to Congress.
Owensboro Nat'l Bank v. Stephens, 44 F.3d 388 (6th Cir. 1994). Thus, the Owensboro decision
contradicts the public policy concerns behind the enactment of section 92.
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In addition to the Owensboro court's lack of deference to Congress'
intentions for section 92, the court failed to acknowledge the purposes behind
the McCarran-Ferguson Act. 18 9 That Act was a quick and direct response by
Congress to the Supreme Court's decision in South-Eastern Underwriters.19
Historically, the several states have been the sole regulators of the insurance
industry. 9' In direct contrast to that clear history, however, the Court held
in South-Eastern Underwriters that insurance was commerce within the control
of Congress through the Commerce Clause." 92 Consequently, one year after
the South-Eastern Underwritersdecision, Congress expressly returned the power
to regulate the insurance industry to the several states by enacting the McCarranFerguson Act. "9 The Act specifically states that "continued regulation and
taxation by the several states of the business of insurance is in the public's best
interest." 14
In contrast to Congress' intention to have insurance regulated by the several
states, the Owensboro court struck down Kentucky's anti-affiliation statute,
section 287, proscribing banks from selling insurance." 9 The Owensboro
decision thwarted the public interests behind the enactment of the McCarranFerguson Act by taking away Kentucky's right to regulate its insurance
industry. "9
The intrusion onto Kentucky's right to regulate the business of

189. See infra notes 190-99 and accompanying text.
190. Prudential Ins. Co. v. Benjamin, 328 U.S. 408, 430 (1946) (stating that the
McCarran-Ferguson Act was enacted to reinstate the power to regulate and tax insurance in the
several states).
191. Paul v. Virginia, 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 168, 183-85 (1868) (holding that insurance contracts
are "local transactions . . . governed by the local law").
192. United States v. South-Eastern Underwriters Ass'n, 322 U.S. 533 (1944) (holding that
insurance contracts were subject to the Commerce Clause).
193. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1011-1015 (1994).
194. Id. § 1011.
195. Owensboro Nat'l Bank v. Stephens, 44 F.3d 388, 393 (6th Cir. 1994). The Owensboro
court held that section 92 preempted Kentucky's anti-affiliation statute, section 287. Id. As a result,
Kentucky was unable to stop national banks from obtaining insurance licenses and selling insurance.
See Roth, supra note 150, at A14; Seiberg, supra note 150, at 1.
196. Congress' purpose for enacting the McCarran-Ferguson Act was to return the power to
regulate insurance to the several states. Prudential Ins. Co. v. Benjamin, 328 U.S. 408, 429-30
(1946). Congress stated in the McCarran-Ferguson Act that its purpose for returning the power to
regulate insurance to the several states was based upon the "public's best interest." 15 U.S.C. §
1011 (1994). In contrast to Congress' stated purpose for enacting the McCarran-Ferguson Act, the
Owensboro court took much of the power to regulate the insurance industry away from the several
states. See Roth, supra note 150, at A14; Seiberg, supra note 150, at 1 (noting that a resolution in
favor of the banking industry, like the Owensboro decision, would allow national banks to sell
insurance despite state legislation to the contrary).
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insurance is further magnified by the statewide basis upon which the decision
allows national banks to sell insurance. "9
The result obtained in Owensboro cannot be considered an adequate solution
to the conflict between section 92 and the state anti-affiliation statutes. The
result directly contradicts the essential premises behind both section 92 and the
McCarran-Ferguson Act. 198 One possible explanation for this error is that the
Owensboro court used the wrong test.'1"
2. The Owensboro Court's Use of the Pireno Criteria was Incorrect
As the Owensboro dissent noted, the majority's use of the Pireno criteria
to define the phrase "business of insurance" was incorrect.' °° That phrase
appears in two separate clauses of section 2(b) of the McCarran-Ferguson
The issue in Pireno concerned the second clause of section 2(b),
Act."
which deals with antitrust exemptions for insurance companies operating in the
business of insurance. 2" In contrast, both the Owensboro and Fabe courts
addressed the reverse-preemption issue, which deals with the first clause of
section 2(b) of the McCarran-Ferguson Act.2"3 In Fabe, the Supreme Court
distinguished its definition of the business of insurance from its earlier definition
204
in Pireno based on the two separate clauses in the McCarran-Ferguson Act.

197. The OCC has supported the interpretation of section 92 allowing national banks to sell
insurance on a statewide basis. OCC Inter. Ltr. 366 [1985-1987 Transfer Binder] Fed. Banking L.
Rep. (CCH) 85,536 (Aug. 18, 1986). As a result, Kentucky's Insurance Commissioner will have
to work with the OCC on issues that used to be exclusively within the states' authority. Seiberg,
supra note 150, at 1. See also Hofmann, supra note 126. at 32J (noting that a Supreme Court
decision following the Owensboro decision would lead to a dual state and federal system of
regulation concerning the business of insurance).
198. See supra notes 185-97 and accompanying text.
199. Owensboro, 44 F.3d at 394 (Batchelder, J., dissenting). Batchelder suggested that the
majority's use of the Pireno Court's definition of the "business of insurance" was incorrect. Id.
200. Id.
201. Owensboro Nat'l Bank v. Stephens, 44 F.3d 388, 394 (6th Cir. 1994) (Batchelder, J.,
dissenting) (relying on the Supreme Court's subsequent decision in Fabe to distinguish the two
separate definitions of the "business of insurance").
202. Union Labor Life Ins. Co. v. Pireno, 458 U.S. 119, 126 (1982). Justice Brennan wrote,
"[t]he only issue before us is whether [the insurance company's] peer review practices are exempt
from antitrust scrutiny as part of the business of insurance." Id.
203. Owensboro, 44 F.3d at 389; United States Dept. of Treasury v. Fabe, 508 U.S. 491,493
(1993).
204. Fabe, 508 U.S. at 504. The Court distinguished the first and second clauses of section
2(b) of the McCarran-Ferguson Act. Id. The court wrote that
[tihe language of § 2(b) is unambiguous: the first clause commits laws "enacted... for
the purpose of regulating the business of insurance" to the States, while the second
clause exempts only "the business of insurance" itself from the antitrust laws. To
equate laws "enacted. . . for the purpose of regulating the business of insurance" with
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The slight distinction between the Pireno and Fabe definitions is important
because the two tests have yielded different results under similar
circumstances.
The Owensboro court held that section 92 preempted Kentucky's section
287.") The court reasoned that section 287 failed to satisfy the requirements
for reverse preemption under the McCarran-Ferguson Act. 207
More
specifically, the Owensboro court ruled that section 287, which prohibits the sale
of insurance by national banks, did not fit within the Pireno Court's definition
of the "business of insurance."208
However, the Pireno Court narrowly defined the "business of insurance"
for antitrust cases, not reverse preemption cases. 2'
In contrast, the
Owensboro court should have applied the Fabe Court's definition which
addressed the same issue as the Owensboro court."
Further, the Fabe
Court's definition of the "business of insurance" only required that state laws
regulate the relationships between policyholders and insurance companies to pass
the first prong of the McCarran-Ferguson test.21' It is likely that section 287
would have passed the first prong of the McCarran-Ferguson test under the Fabe
definition, as that law limited from whom policyholders could purchase their
2
insurance products .12

the "business of insurance" itself, as petitioner urges us to do, would be to read words
out of the statute.
Id.
205. The Owensboro and Barnett decisions arrived at opposite conclusions under nearly
identical facts. Meyer, supra note 9, at 8; McCullough, supra note 3, at 72; State Attacks, supra
note 43, at 2. The Owensboro court used a hybrid test incorporating both the Pireno and Fabe
decisions. Owensboro, 44 F.3d at 391-92. In contrast, the Barnettcourt relied solely upon the Fabe
Court's test. Barnett Bank of Marion County v. Gallagher, 43 F.3d 631,635-36 (1 th Cir. 1995).
206. Owensboro, 44 F.3d at 389.
207. Owensboro Nat'l Bank v. Stephens, 44 F.3d 388, 392 (6th Cir. 1994) (arguing that
Kentucky's section 287 did not possess the necessary aim to be considered as regulating the
"business of insurance" under the McCarran-Ferguson test).
208. Owensboro, 44 F.3d at 392 (Batchelder, J., dissenting). The Owensboro court held that
section 287 merely excluded people from participating in insurance, which it did not consider a
regulation of the "business of insurance" under the Pireno Court's definition. Id.
209. See Kennedy, supra note 159, at 529; Gilet, supra note 159, at 272.
210. Owensboro, 44 F.3d at 389; United States Dept. of Treasury v. Fabe, 508 U.S. 491, 493
(1993).
211. Fabe, 508 U.S. at 504.
212. Owensboro, 44 F.3d at 396 (Batchelder, J., dissenting). The court noted that the proper
standard for determining whether Kentucky section 287 passed the first prong of the
McCarran-Ferguson analysis was whether the "statute is centrally concerned with policyholders."
Id. Under that test, section 287 should have passed the first prong. Id.
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The Owensboro error may have been caused by the court's reliance on the
district court's use of the Pireno test.21 3 The district court's decision was
made before the Fabe decision. 1 4 The Owensboro dissent suggested that the
Fabe test would be the only test required today.215 The dissent's view was
adopted in a subsequent case by the Eleventh Circuit on the same issue of
reverse-preemption." 6 In fact, the Eleventh Circuit's decision under the Fabe
test was the opposite of the Owensboro decision. 27' A more extensive look at
the Eleventh Circuit's decision helps to clarify this distinction.
B. The Eleventh Circuit's Attempted Resolution of the Conflict
Shortly after the Owensboro decision, the Eleventh Circuit addressed the
same conflict in the case of Barnett Bank of Marion County v. Gallagher.1 8
In Barnett, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit held that
Florida's anti-affiliation statute (Florida Section 626.988)219 preempted section
92.220 After applying the McCarran-Ferguson test, the court found that
Florida Section 626.988 "regulate [ d] the business of insurance," and that section
92 does not "specifically relateil to the business of insurance." 2 ' This result
is the exact opposite of the result reached in Owensboro.222 As a result, the
Supreme Court granted certiorari to the petitioners of the Barnett decision. 3
The Barnett court began its analysis with the first prong of the
McCarran-Ferguson test by asking whether Florida Section 626.988 was enacted
for the purpose of regulating the business of insurance.224 The court applied

213. Owensboro Nat'l Bank v. Stephens, 44 F.3d 388, 398 (6th Cir. 1994).
214. Id.
215. Id. at 396.
216. Barnett Bank of Marion County v. Gallagher, 43 F.3d 631 (1
lth Cir. 1995). The Barnett
court also addressed the issue of reverse-preemption. Id, at 634.
217. See Meyer, supra note 9, at 8; McCullough, supra note 3, at 72.
218. 43 F.3d 631 (11th Cir. 1995). The Barnett court handed down its decision on January
30, 1995. The Owensboro court handed down its decision on December 29, 1994. Owensboro, 44
F.3d at 388.
219. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 626.988(2) (West 1996 & Supp. 1997) provides:
No insurance agent or solicitor licensed by the Department of Insurance under the
provisions of this chapter who is associated with, under contract with, retained by,
owned or controlled by, to any degree, directly or indirectly, or employed by, a
financial institution shall engage in insurance agency activities as an employee, officer,
director, agent, or associate of a financial institution agency.
220. Barnett, 43 F.3d at 632.
221. Id. at 636-37.
222. See Meyer, supra note 9, at 8; McCullough, supra note 3, at 72.
223. Barnett Bank of Marion County v. Gallagher, 43 F.3d 631 (11th Cir.), cert. granted,
Barnett Bank of Marion County v. Nelson, 116 S. Ct. 39 (1995).
224. Barnett, 43 F.3d at 634.
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the Fabe test described in the Owensboro dissent.'
Relying on Fabe, the
court asked whether Florida Section 626.988 was enacted to protect
policyholders by regulating their relationships with the insurers. 226 The
Eleventh Circuit concluded that Florida Section 626.988 did regulate the
business of insurance. 2 7 The court reasoned that the purpose behind Florida's
statute was to protect policyholders by preventing the possibility of
.overreaching by [the] financial institutions if [they were] permitted to sell
insurance.""' The court noted that banks would be in a prime position to
force insureds to take bad loans or inappropriate insurance policies.229
The Barnett court next addressed the second prong of the McCarranFerguson test: whether section 92 relates to the business of insurance. 210 The
court held that section 92 did not relate to the business of insurance. 231 The
court reasoned that section 92's concern is banking, not insurance. 232 The
court further reasoned that section 92 was enacted in 1916 when it was generally
believed that Congress could not "regulate" the business of insurance.233
Thus, the court concluded that Florida Section 626.988 preempted section 92
under the McCarran-Ferguson Act's reverse preemption.2
The insurance industry's victory in the Eleventh Circuit was short-lived,
however, and on March 26, 1996, the Supreme Court overruled the Eleventh
Circuit's decision.2 3 This result allows national banks in all fifty states to sell
insurance out of small towns without geographic limitation. 216 Thus, a need

225. Id. at 635. The court noted that the Fabe court was concerned with the policyholder and
their relationships to their insurance companies. Id.
226. Id.
227. Id. at 636.
228. Id. at 635. The court determined that a statute enacted to keep overreaching banks out
of the insurance industry was enacted to protect policyholders. Id. Thus, Florida section 626.988
passed the first prong of the McCarran-Ferguson analysis. Id.
229. Barnett Bank of Marion County v. Gallagher, 43 F.3d 631, 635 (11th Cir. 1995).
230. Id. at 634, 636. The McCarran-Ferguson test mandates that a state statute enacted to
regulate the business of insurance must be preempted by a conflicting federal law which "relates to
the business of insurance." Id. at 634 (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 1012(b)).
231. Id. at 637.
232. Id.
233. Id. The court reasoned that Barnett Bank's use of section 92 was an attempt to control
the insurance industry. ld. at 636-37. According to the court, the control of the insurance industry
lies solely in the several states under the authority of the McCarran-Ferguson Act. Id.
234. Id. at 637.
235. See Barnett Bank of Marion County'v. Nelson, 116 S. Ct. 1103 (1996) (holding that
section 92 of the National Bank Act preempts Florida's anti-affiliation statute).
236. See supra notes 92-100 and accompanying text (explaining that allowing national banks
to sell insurance out of the small towns is in effect allowing national banks to sell insurance without
geographic limitations).
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exists for congressional action in the form of an amendment to section 92.37
A detailed analysis of the Supreme Court's decision in Barnett will clarify this

need.
C. The Supreme Court's FailedAttempt at Resolution
Unlike the preceding circuit court decisions, the Supreme Court's decision
which analyzed the conflict between section 92 and Florida Section 626.988 did
not begin with the two-pronged McCarran-Ferguson test.238 Instead, the Court
first addressed the question of whether Congress, in enacting section 92,
intended to exercise its constitutionally delegated authority to set aside the laws
of the several states.239 The Court reached the conclusion that, under ordinary
Supremacy Clause jurisprudence, section 92 would clearly preempt Florida's
anti-affiliation statute.2 0 In reaching its conclusion, the Court put aside the
special
concerns of the McCarran-Ferguson Act and focused solely on section
24
92.

1

The Court's analysis of the Supremacy Clause began with the question of
whether section 92 and Florida Section 626.988 were in "irreconcilable
conflict."242 Although the two statutes did not impose directly conflicting
duties, Florida Section 626.988 did prohibit national banks' permissible power
to sell insurance under section 92.43 Thus, the Court held that Florida's law

237. The need for congressional action in the form of an amendment is premised on the
legislative history of section 92 and the McCarran-Ferguson Act. For an in-depth discussion of the
background of those statutes, see supra notes 54-71 and 128-44, and accompanying text.
238. Barnett, 116 S. Ct. at 1103. See also Owensboro Nat'l Bank v. Stephens, 44 F.3d 388
(6th Cir. 1994); Barnett Bank of Marion County v. Gallagher, 43 F.3d 631 (11 th Cir. 1995).
239. Barnett, 116 S. Ct. at 1107.
240. Id. at 1111. The Court's primary question in determining whether section 92 preempted
Florida's anti-affiliation statute was whether "Congress, in enacting... [section 92], intend[ed] to
exercise its Constitutionally delegated authority to set aside the laws of a State." Id. at 1107. The
Court noted that if Congress intended to set aside Florida's anti-affiliation statute, then the
Supremacy Clause requires the Court to follow the federal rather than the state law. Id. (quoting
California Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Guerra, 479 U.S. 272, 280-81 (1987)). For a reprint of the
entire Supremacy Clause, see supra note 14.
In attempting to ascertain Congress' intent, the Court noted that more often than not, explicit
language of preemption does not appear in the federal statute. Barnett, 116 S. Ct. at 1108. Rather,
the Court determined that it is permissible to interpret a clear, but implicit preemptive intent on the
part of Congress in the federal statute's "structure and purpose." Id. (relying on the Court's earlier
holding in Fidelity Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. de la Cuesta, 458 U.S. 141, 152-53 (1982)).
241. Barnett Bank of Marion County v. Nelson, 116 S. Ct. 1103, 1107 (1996).
242. Id. at 1108.
243. Id. The Court gave the following example of two directly conflicting duties: "if the
federal law said, 'you must sell insurance,' while the state law said, 'you may not.'" Id.
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"[stood] as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes
and objectives of Congress [in enacting section 92]."2"
Next, the Court specifically addressed Congress' purpose for enacting
section 92.24" The Court noted that the language of section 92 suggests a
broad, rather than limited, grant of power to the national banks.2' Further,
this expression of power is not one, in the Court's view, that "Congress would
want States to forbid, or impair significantly .
247 For support, the Court
relied on its earlier decision in Franklin National Bank v. New York.248 In
Franklin, the Court held that a New York law concerning advertising was in
conflict with the National Bank Act and the Federal Reserve Act, and therefore
invalid.2"9 The Franklin Court's rationale was that express powers of the
National Bank Act and the Federal Reserve Act grant more than mere passive
powers to national banks, thus requiring the preemption of state laws to the
contrary.'
Following this rationale, the Barnett Court held that section 92
is an express grant of power and contains no indication that Congress intended
to subject its power to the laws of the States." 5
In its discussion of section 92's purpose, the Barnett Court included, almost
in its entirety, the letter written to Congress by the Comptroller of the Currency
in 1916.252 In that letter, the Comptroller stated that it would be "unwise and
.. . undesirable" for banks in large cities to be afforded the insurance powers
of section 92. 25 3 However, the Court down-played the relevance of this letter,
noting that the letter says nothing about state law limitations.'
Here, the
Court failed to consider that the Comptroller's letter and the enactment of
section 92 occurred twenty-nine years prior to the enactment of the
McCarran-Ferguson Act. 255 A careful reading of the letter suggests that the
result obtained in Barnett, allowing national banks to sell insurance nationwide

244. Id.
245. Id.
246. Id.
247. Barnett Bank of Marion County v. Nelson, 116 S. Ct. 1103, 1108 (1996).
248. 347 U.S. 373 (1954).
249. Id. at 377.
250. Id.
251. Barnett, 116 S. Ct. at 1110.
252. Id. For portions of the Comptroller's letter, see supra notes 61-63.
253. Barnett Bank of Marion County v. Nelson, 116 S. Ct. 1103, 1108 (1996).
254. Id. The Court noted that "[t]he letter refers to limitations that federal regulation might
impose, but it says nothing about limitations imposed by state regulation or state law." Id.
255. Section 92 of the National Bank Act was enacted by Congress in 1916. 12 U.S.C. § 92
(1994). In 1945, twenty-nine years after the enactment of section 92, Congress enacted the
McCarran-Ferguson Act. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1011-1015 (1994).
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out of their small town offices, was never the purpose for enacting section
92.56

Likewise, the result obtained by the Supreme Court in Barnett contradicted
the purpose behind Congress' enactment of the McCarran-Ferguson Act.2 57
The Court held in Barnet that the McCarran-Ferguson Act did not apply to the
conflict between section 92 and Florida Section 626.988."' The Court's
reasoning addressed only the second prong of the McCarran-Ferguson Act and
asked the question of whether section 92 relates to the business of
insurance. 9 Since the Court held that section 92 related to both banking and
insurance, there was no need to address the first prong of the
McCarran-Ferguson test."
The Court's analysis of the McCarran-Ferguson test's second prong
concentrated on the Act's language and purpose.2 6' The relevant test asks the
question whether the federal statute, here section 92, "specifically relates to the
business of insurance."262 The Court held that under "ordinary English,"

256. For a careful reading of the Comptroller's letter, see supra notes 54-71 and accompanying
text. This discussion includes the following portion of the Comptroller's letter, stating that "ji]t
seems desirable from the standpoint of public policy and banking efficiency that this authority should
be limited to banks in small communities." 53 CONG. REC. 11,001 (1916). The Comptroller, in
his letter, goes on to state, "I think it would be unwise and therefore undesirable to confer this
privilege generally upon banks in large cities where the legitimate business of banking affords ample
scope for the energies of trained and expert bankers." Id.
257. The clear legislative purpose of Congress' enactment of the McCarran-Ferguson Act was
to "broadly . . . give support to the existing and future state systems for regulating and taxing the
business of insurance." Prudential Ins. Co. V. Benjamin, 328 U.S. 408, 429 (1946).
258. Barnett, 116 S. Ct. at 1111 (stating that the McCarran-Ferguson Act's special preemption
rle does not apply under the Barnett facts because section 92 specifically relates to the business of
insurance).
259. Barnett Bank of Marion County v. Nelson, 116 S. Ct. 1103, 1111-12 (1996) (using the
language and purpose of the McCarran-Ferguson Act to determine whether section 92 satisfies the
"specifically relates to the 'business of insurance'" test; also known as the second prong of the
McCarran-Ferguson test). 15 U.S.C. § 1012(b) (1994). The McCarran-Ferguson Act provides
protection for federal preemption for those laws that are "enacted by any State for the purpose of
regulating the business of insurance. . . ." Id.
260. This conclusion is based upon the McCarran-Ferguson Act's test. For an in depth analysis
of the workings of that test, see supra notes 128-41 and accompanying text.
261. Barnett, 116 S. Ct. at II11.
262. The relevant section of the McCarran-Ferguson Act reads that, "[n]o Act of Congress shall
be construed to invalidate, impair, or supersede any law enacted by any State for the purpose of
regulating the business of insurance, or which imposes a fee or tax upon such business, unless such
Act specifically relates to the business of insurance." 15 U.S.C. § 1012(b) (1994) (emphasis added).
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The statute
section 92 clearly relates to the business of insurance.26
specifically grants permission to national banks to both solicit and sell various
types of insurance.264
The Court rejected Florida's contention that a statute could only relate to
The Court noted that neither the language
one thing-in this case, banking.'
nor the purpose of the McCarran-Ferguson Act require a federal statute to relate
only to insurance. 2' The purpose of the McCarran-Ferguson Act is addressed
as further support for the Court's holding that the Supremacy Clause and not the
McCarran-Ferguson Act should control the conflict between section 92 and
Florida Section 626.988.267 As the Court acknowledged, the purpose of the
First, the Act was created to ensure
McCarran-Ferguson Act is two-fold.2
that the power to regulate the insurance industry was maintained by the several
states.26 9 Second, the Act was enacted to ensure that silence on the part of
Congress would not be construed to impose burdens on states' regulation of the
business of insurance. zT It was this silence concern that led the Court back
to the language of section 92, which it found to be quite explicitly a grant of
express power in the national banks to sell insurance in towns with less than
Thus, under the Court's interpretation of the
5000 people.27'
McCarran-Ferguson Act's purpose, Congress' clear grant of insurance power
in section 92 is governed by the Supremacy Clause, not the McCarran-Ferguson

263. Barnett, 116 S. Ct. at 1111.
264. Id.
265. Barnett Bank of Marion County v. Nelson, 116 S. Ct. 1103, 1113 (1996). The Court
stated that "a statute may specifically relate to more than one thing. Just as an ordinance forbidding
dogs in city parks specifically relates to dogs and parks, so a statute permitting banks to sell
insurance can specifically relate to banks and to insurance." Id. The Court went on to note that the
actual language of the McCarran-Ferguson Act requires a statute to specifically relate, not
predominately relate, to insurance. Id.
266. Id.
267. id. at 1112.
268. Id.
269. Id. In 1946, the Court made clear that this was Congress' primary reason for enacting
the McCarran-Ferguson Act. Prudential Ins. Co. v. Benjamin, 328 U.S. 408 (1946). This belief
is also shared by the National Association of Insurance Commissioners. In their brief to the
Supreme Court concerning the Barnett decision, the NAIC wrote that "[The lI]egislative history of
the McCarran-Ferguson Act indicates that the Act was intended to preserve state insurance laws and
regulations." Brief for Amicus Curiae National Association of Insurance Commissioners in Support
of Respondents at 4, Barnett Bank of Marion County v. Nelson, 116 S. Ct. 39 (1995) (No. 94-1837)
(relying on 1945 NAIC PROC. 156, at 159 and the Court's decision in Group Life & Health
Insurance Co. v. Royal Drug Co., 440 U.S. 205, 208 (1979)).
270. Barnett, 116 S. Ct. at 1112.
271. Barnett Bank of Marion County v. Nelson, 116 S. Ct. 1103, 1112 (1996).
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Act."
And, under ordinary Supremacy Cause jurisprudence, the state law
must give way to the federal law. 2'
The aggregate result of the Barnett holding is that Florida and the other
forty-nine states are now unable to control national banks selling insurance on
a statewide basis out of their small town offices. 2 74 This decision has thwarted
the congressional intentions behind section 92 and the McCarran-Ferguson Act.
Section 92 was enacted to aid small-town national banks.27 In contrast to that
purpose, however, the Supreme Court's decision in Barnett allows national
banks to exploit that federal statute. 6 Thus, a congressional amendment is
needed to allow section 92 to coincide with Congress' original intentions." 7
Likewise, however, a congressional amendment would have been necessary
if the Supreme Court had decided to affirm the Eleventh Circuit's decision. If
that were the result, then states with anti-affiliation statutes could prohibit
national banks from exercising any of their expressed section 92 powers.278
That result would eliminate the benefits to small town national banks in the
sixteen states with anti-affiliation statutes.279 For example, a national bank
operating in a small town would have been prohibited from complementing its
income with insurance sales.2 8 Thus, Congress' original purpose for enacting

272. Id.
273. Id.
274. This was the prediction made before the Court's decision in the Barnett case. Roth, supra
note 150, at A14. Roth wrote that "[i]f the banks win [in the Barnett case], national banks [will]
be able to sell insurance from coast to coast." Id.
275. This conclusion is warranted by section 92's historical and legislative background. Section
92 was enacted in response to Congress' concern over the financial stability of the national banks
located in small towns. 53 CONG. REC. 11,001 (1916). For the complete historical and legislative
background of section 92, see supra notes 54-71 and accompanying text.
276. Like the Owensboro decision, if the Supreme Court holds that section 92 preempts
Florida's anti-affiliation statute, then the states will not be able to prohibit national banks from
operating under section 92. Roth, supra note 150, at A14 (noting that if the banking industry is
successful in arguing that section 92 should preempt Florida Section 626.988, then banks will be free
to sell insurance from coast to coast).
277. The contradiction between the application of section 92 and its congressional intentions
have created a loophole in the law. Thus, "[w]hen time and technology open up a loophole, it is
up to Congress to decide whether it should be plugged, and how." Independent Ins. Agents of Am.,
Inc. v. Ludwig, 997 F.2d 958, 961 (D.C. Cir. 1993). For the policy reasons explained in the OCC
1916 letter to Congress, see supra note 67 and accompanying text.
278. Roth, supra note 150, at A14 ("If [the Eleventh Circuit's decision in Barnett is affirmed],
national banks twill] be blocked from selling insurance nationwide.").
279. Section 92 was enacted by Congress to aid small town national banks. 53 CONG. REC.
11,001 (1916). However, in states with anti-affiliation statues, those small town banks would be
blocked from obtaining the benefits that Congress intended when it enacted section 92. See
generally Roth, supra note 150, at A14. For a complete listing of the states which currently have
anti-affiliation statutes, see supra note 12.
280. Roth, supra note 150, at A14.
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section 92 would be completely thwarted in those states that have enacted
anti-affiliation statutes.
Additionally, if the Supreme Court had affirmed the Eleventh Circuit's
decision in Barnett, national banks would be allowed to sell insurance on a
statewide basis in the majority of states because they have not enacted
anti-affiliation statutes.2 11 In those states, the legislative purpose for. section
92 would be violated in the same manner as it was in the Sixth Circuit's
Owensboro decision. 2 2 Instead of aiding only small town national banks, a
decision by the Supreme Court affirming the Eleventh Circuit's Barnett decision
would aid all national banks on a statewide basis in the majority of states. 21,
Fortunately, the problems associated with the Supreme Court's decision in
Barnett can be solved by an amendment to section 92.2"
Specifically,
Congress should narrow the scope of section 92 to coincide with its original
intentions. 2" The next Section of this Note provides the amendment to section
92 that will achieve Congress' original intentions.
IV.

MODEL AMENDMENT TO SECTION

92

In essence, the conflict between section 92 and the several state
anti-affiliation statutes is a power struggle between the banking and insurance
industries. 2' The banking industry seeks to exercise its section 92 insurance
powers to sell insurance on a statewide basis. 21 In contrast, the insurance
industry argues that states should be allowed to prohibit the national banks from
selling any form of insurance through anti-affiliation statutes authorized under

281. The Barnett decision held that states could pass anti-affiliation statutes prohibiting national
banks from exercising their section 92 powers. Barnett Bank of Marion County v. Gallagher, 43
F.3d 631, 637 (1 th Cir. 1995). Logically, states without anti-affiliation statutes would have no
means to prohibit national banks from selling insurance under section 92.
282. See supra notes 177-97 and accompanying text (contrasting the Owensboro decision with
the Congressional purposes for the enactment of section 92).
283. Under the OCC's interpretation of section 92 of the National Bank Act, national banks
properly located and doing business under section 92 may sell insurance statewide. Independent Ins.
Agents of Am., Inc. v. Ludwig, 997 F.2d 958 (D.C. Cir. 1993); NBD Bank v. Bennett, 67 F.3d
629 (7th Cir. 1995).
284. See supra note 32 and accompanying text.
285. See supra notes 274-83 and accompanying text.
286. The current conflict between section 92 and anti-affliation statutes authorized under the
McCarran-Ferguson Act is only the most recent of many battles between the banking and insurance
industries. Whiting, supra note 3, at 1; Seiberg, supra note 150, at 1; Hofmann, supra note 1, at
32B.
287. See Brief of Petitioner, Barnett Bank of Marion County v. Nelson, 116 S. Ct. 1103 (1996)
(No. 94-1837). In its brief, Barnett Bank argued that it should be free to exercise all of its insurance
powers authorized under section 92. Id. at 5.
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the McCarran-Ferguson Act.2 88 These opposing positions appear to be
mutually exclusive." 9 Yet, when Congress enacted the McCarran-Ferguson
Act, section 92 had been a part of the United States Code for twenty-nine
years. 29 The fact that Congress did not amend section 92 when it enacted the
McCarran-Ferguson Act is evidence that Congress intended the two Acts to
coexist.
This Note suggests that the conflict between section 92 and the state
anti-affiliation statutes can be resolved with a single congressional amendment
to section 92 of the National Bank Act. The key to this amendment's ability to

agree with the original intentions of both section 92 and the McCarran-Ferguson
Act is its element of compromise. 2 9' In contrast, the judicial attempts to
resolve this conflict in the Owensboro and Barnett decisions were unable to
reach a compromise due to the language of the statutes involved. 2" As a
result, both of those decisions contradicted the congressional intentions for
section 92 and the McCarran-Ferguson Act. 29 Likewise, a decision by the
Supreme Court was unable to overcome the language barrier of section 92.29
Thus, the following amendment is the only means of bringing a satisfactory
resolution to this area of the law.

288. The insurance industry's argument was based on the theory that the McCarran-Ferguson
Act allows state anti-affiliation statutes to preempt Section 92. Brief of Respondents, Barnett (No.
94-1837).
289. It appears that section 92's broad scope of authorization to the national banks encroaches
upon the several states' abilities to regulate the business of insurance in accordance with the
McCarran-Ferguson Act. Likewise, if states were permitted to prohibit all national banks from
exercising their section 92 powers, then the public interests behind the enactment of section 92 have
been thwarted.
290. The McCarran-Ferguson Act was enacted in 1945. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1011-1015 (1994).
Additionally, Congress added section 92 to the National Bank Act in 1916. 12 U.S.C. § 92 (1994).
291. Since section 92 and the McCarran-Ferguson Act appear to be existing as mutually
exclusive, both the banking and insurance industries must compromise. Under the amended version
of section 92, the banking industry must compromise the ability to sell insurance beyond the limits
of the small towns in which they are properly located. This will place the scope of section 92 in
accordance with the historical and legislative background of that Act. See supra notes 54-71 and
accompanying text (discussing the background of section 92).
Further, the insurance industry must compromise the right to prohibit national banks from
exercising their section 92 powers. To accomplish this, paragraph three of the amended section 92
provides that section 92 relates to the business of insurance. The effect of this amendment gives the
several states the power to regulate all aspects of the business of insurance except the narrow area
covered by the amended version of section 92. See infra section IV.
292. The Supreme Court's choices were either a complete victory for the banking industry or
a complete victory for the insurance industry and the several states. See supra notes 242-73 and
accompanying text (comparing the Supreme Court's options with Congress' original intentions).
293. See supra notes 176-97, 281-83, and accompanying text.
294. See supra notes 278-83 and accompanying text.
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A Model Amendment to Section 92
The pertinent portion of section 92 currently includes the following:
[1.1 In addition to the powers now vested by law in national banking
associations organized under the laws of the United States any such
association located and doing business in any place the population of which
does not exceed five thousand inhabitants, as shown by the last preceding
decennial census, may, under such rules and regulations as may be
prescribed by the Comptroller of the Currency, act as the agent for any
fire, life, or other insurance company authorized by the authorities of the
State in which said bank is located to do business in said State . ...
In addition to the current text of section 92, the following paragraphs should be
added:
2. The powers vested in national banking associations under the first
paragraph of this Act shall be limited by the following: A national banking
association properly located and operating under the first paragraph of this
Act may Not, under any circumstances, act as the agent for any fire, life,
or other insurance company when the Insured's residence or place of
business is Not properly located in the same place of less than five
thousand inhabitants as the national banking association.
3. Congress declares that this section of the National Bank Act relates to
a limited area of the business of insurance. The continued regulation and
taxation of all other aspects of the business of insurance shall remain within
the power of the several states.
Comments: This amendment to section 92 of the National Bank Act is in
response to the recent confusion surrounding the relationship between section 92
and state laws authorized under the McCarran-Ferguson Act. 95 On one side
of the conflict, the OCC has expanded section 92 to allow national banks to sell
insurance on a statewide basis.2" On the other side, state legislatures have
passed laws which prohibit national banks from exercising rights expressly given
to them by Congress. 98 This model amendment compromises between both

295. 12 U.S.C. § 92 (1994). For the complete text of section 92, see supra note 56.
296. See, e.g., Barnett Bank of Marion County v. Gallagher, 43 F.3d 631 (1 1th Cir. 1995),
rev'd, 116 S. Ct. 1103 (1996); Owensboro Nat'l Bank v. Stephens, 44 F.3d 388 (6th Cir. 1994),
cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 1350 (1996).
297. OCC Inter. Ltr. 366 [1985-1987 Trandfer Binder] Fed. Banking L. Rep. (CCH) 185,536
(Aug. 18, 1986).
298. See supra note 12 for the 16 states which have enacted anti-affiliation statutes.
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positions and returns the scope of section 92 to agree with Congress' original
intentions.
It is well established that prior to the enactment at section 92, the national
banks possessed no power to act as insurance agents.29 In 1916, Congress
created a limited exception to that general rule by enacting section 92 of the
National Bank Act.'
That Act was intended to aid the struggling national
banks that were located in the many small towns across this country. 3°' In
recent years, section 92 has been expanded so that it is possible for large
national banks with branch offices properly located in small towns to sell
insurance to customers in their large cities. 2 This result is clearly contrary
to Congress' original intentions for section 92.
The second paragraph of the amended version of section 92 resolves this
problem by reducing the scope of the insurance market available to national
banks under section 92. Under that paragraph, national banks operating under
section 92 may sell insurance only to customers properly located within that
small town. Thus, small-town national banks may supplement their incomes by
selling insurance locally.
Additionally, large national banks may also
supplement the incomes of their branch offices located within small towns. No
national banks, however, will be permitted to sell insurance in towns of more
than 5000 people. Under this amendment, the scope of section 92 will once
again coincide with Congress' purpose for creating an exception to the general
rule that banks cannot sell insurance.3
In 1945, twenty-nine years after the enactment of section 92, Congress
enacted the McCarran-Ferguson Act. 3'
In that Act, Congress gave the
several states the ability to regulate and tax the insurance industry.'0
Also
included in that Act was the ability for state insurance laws to preempt federal
laws which interfered with the states' ability to regulate and tax the business of

299. See supra notes 55-56 and accompanying text.
300. 12 U.S.C. § 92 (1994). See supra notes 54-71 and accompanying text for a discussion
of the historical and legislative background behind the enactment of section 92.
301. See supra notes 179-88 and accompanying text.
302. OCC Inter. Ltr. 366 [1985-1985 Transfer Binder] Fed. Banking L. Rep. (CCH) 1 85,536
(Aug. 18, 1986). This interpretation of section 92 has been upheld in the circuit courts.
Independent Ins. Agents of Am., Inc. v. Ludwig, 997 F.2d 958 (D.C. Cir. 1993); NBD Bank v.
Bennett, 67 F.3d 629 (7th Cir. 1995).
303. This conclusion is warranted by section 92's legislative history. Section 92 was enacted
to aid small town national banks. 53 CONG. REc. 11,001 (daily ed. July 14, 1916) (statement of
Comptroller Williams). In accordance, the revised version of section 92 limits the national banks'
abilities to sell insurance by reducing the scope of bank insurance sales power to small towns. See
supra notes 54-71 and accompanying text for a discussion of the history of section 92.
304. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1011-1015 (1994).

305. Id.
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insurance.'
Thus, under the McCarran-Ferguson Act, state insurance laws
could preempt federal laws, unless the federal laws specifically related to the
business of insurance.'
In 1945, Congress had already enacted section 92
as an exception to the general rule that national banks could not sell
insurance."'o
Since Congress enacted the McCarran-Ferguson Act after section 92, it is
only logical that it intended for them to coincide. Thus, the idea that laws
created under the authority of the McCarran-Ferguson Act could preempt section
92 is illogical. The third paragraph of the amended version of section 92
acknowledges this argument. That paragraph states that section 92 relates to a
small portion of the business of insurance. Therefore, no laws promulgated
under the authority of the McCarran-Ferguson Act can preempt section 92. The
result of this paragraph is that the states remain free to regulate their insurance
industries, but that those regulations may not take away the limited powers
granted to national banks under section 92.
V.

CONCLUSION

The Owensboro and Barnett decisions illustrate the problems caused by the
ambiguous language of section 92 of the National Bank Act. Those decisions
both misapplied section 92 and the McCarran-Ferguson Act in a manner that
contradicted the original intentions of Congress. Similarly, the Supreme Court
was unable to resolve this conflict in accordance with Congress' purpose for
both statutes. Thus, Congress needs to clarify the language of section 92 to
coincide with its original purpose for enacting that section. The model
amendment proposed in Section IV of this Note accomplishes that goal by
narrowing the scope of insurance sales that banks may engage in under section
92. Section 92 will once again exist as a limited exception to the general
proposition that national banks are not authorized to sell insurance. In that
respect, the historical and legislative background of section 92 and the
McCarran-Ferguson Act will be served. Additionally, the amendment proposed
in this Note reinstates that the several states possess the power to control the
insurance industry outside of the limited exception provided in section 92. This
was the state of the law in 1945 when Congress enacted the McCarran-Ferguson
Act. Finally, by reinstating the original intentions of Congress, the amendment
proposed in this Note will bring an end to this chapter of the insurance and
banking war.
Kevin M. Lesperance

306. Id.
307. Id.
308. Federal Reserve Act Amendments of 1916, Pub. L. No. 270, 39 Stat. 752, 753.
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